Sect.
IX. Of the
Reason of Animals
82. ALL our
reasonings concerning
matter of fact are founded on a
species of Analogy, which
leads
us to expect from any cause the same
events, which we have
observed to
result from similar causes. Where
the causes are entirely
similar,
the analogy is perfect, and the
inference, drawn from it, is
regarded
as certain and conclusive: nor
does any man ever entertain
a doubt
where he sees a piece of iron,
that it will have weight and
cohesion
of parts; as in all other
instances, which have ever
fallen
under his observation. But where the
objects have not so exact a
similarity,
the analogy is less perfect,
and the inference is less
conclusive;
though still it has some
force, in proportion to the
degree
of similarity and resemblance.
The anatomical observations,
formed
upon one animal, are, by this
species of reasoning,
extended to
all animals; and it is certain, that
when the circulation of the
blood,
for instance, is clearly proved
to have place in one
creature, as
a frog, or fish, it forms a strong
presumption, that the same
principle
has place in all. These
analogical observations may
be carried
farther, even to this
science, of which we are now
treating;
and any theory, by which we
explain the operations of
the understanding,
or the origin and
connexion of the passions in
man,
will acquire additional authority,
if we find, that the same
theory
is requisite to explain the same
phenomena in all other
animals.
We shall make trial of this, with
regard to the hypothesis, by
which
we have, in the foregoing
discourse, endeavoured to
account
for all experimental reasonings; and
it is hoped, that this new
point
of view will serve to confirm all our
former observations.
83. First, It
seems evident,
that animals as well as men learn
many things from experience,
and
infer, that the same events will
always follow from the same
causes.
By this principle they become
acquainted with the more
obvious
properties of external objects, and
gradually, from their birth,
treasure
up a knowledge of the nature
of fire, water, earth,
stones, heights,
depths, &c., and of the
effects which result from
their
operation. The ignorance and
inexperience of the young
are here
plainly distinguishable from the
cunning and sagacity of the
old,
who have learned, by long
observation, to avoid what
hurt
them, and to pursue what gave ease
or pleasure. A horse, that
has been
accustomed to the field, becomes
acquainted with the proper
height
which he can leap, and will never
attempt what exceeds his
force and
ability. An old greyhound will
trust the more fatiguing
part of
the chace to the younger, and will
place himself so as to meet
the
hare in her doubles; nor are the
conjectures, which he forms
on this
occasion, founded in any thing but
his observation and
experience.
This is still more
evident
from the effects of discipline and
education on animals, who,
by the
proper application of rewards and
punishments, may be taught
any course
of action, and most contrary
to their natural instincts
and propensities.
Is it not experience
which renders a dog
apprehensive
of pain, when you menace him, or lift
up the whip to beat him? Is
is not
even experience, which makes him
answer to his name, and
infer, from
such an arbitrary sound, that
you mean him rather than any
of
his fellows, and intend to call him,
when you pronounce it in a
certain
manner, and with a certain tone and
accent?
In all these
cases, we may
observe, that the animal infers some fact
beyond what immediately
strikes
his senses; and that this inference is
altogether founded on past
experience,
while the creature expects from
the present object the same
consequences,
which it has always found in
its observation to result
from similar
objects.
84. Secondly, It
is impossible,
that this inference of the animal
can be founded on any
process of
argument or reasoning, by which he
concludes, that like events
must
follow like objects, and that the
course of nature will always
be
regular in its operations. For if
there be in reality any
arguments
of this nature, they surely lie
too abstruse for the
observation
of such imperfect understandings;
since it may well employ the
utmost
care and attention of a
philosophic genius to
discover and
observe them. Animals, therefore,
are not guided in these
inferences
by reasoning: Neither are children:
Neither are the generality
of mankind,
in their ordinary actions and
conclusions: Neither are
philosophers
themselves, who, in all the
active parts of life, are,
in the
main, the same with the vulgar,
and are governed by the same
maxims.
Nature must have provided some
other principle, of more
ready,
and more general use and
application; nor can an
operation
of such immense consequence in life,
as that of inferring effects
from
causes, be trusted to the
uncertain process of
reasoning and
argumentation. Were this doubtful
with regard to men, it seems
to
admit of no question with regard to
the brute creation; and the
conclusion
being once firmly established
in the one, we have a strong
presumption,
from all the rules of
analogy, that it ought to be
universally
admitted, without any
exception or reserve. It is
custom
alone, which engages animals,
from every object, that
strikes
their senses, to infer its usual
attendant, and carries their
imagination,
from the appearance of the
one, to conceive the other,
in that
particular manner, which we
denominate belief. No other
explication
can be given of this
operation, in all the
higher, as
well as lower classes of sensitive
beings, which fall under our
notice
and observation.*
* Since all
reasonings concerning
facts or causes is derived
merely from custom, it may
be asked
how it happens, that men so much
surpass animals in
reasoning, and
one man so much surpasses another?
Has not the same custom the
same
influence on all?
We shall here
endeavour briefly
to explain the great difference in
human understandings: After
which
the reason of the difference between
men and animals will easily
be comprehended.
1. When we have
lived any
time, and have been accustomed to the
uniformity of nature, we
acquire
a general habit, by which we always
transfer the known to the
unknown,
and conceive the latter to resemble
the former. By means of this
general
habitual principle, we regard
even one experiment as the
foundation
of reasoning, and expect a
similar event with some
degree of
certainty, where the experiment
has been made accurately,
and free
from all foreign circumstances.
It is therefore considered
as a
matter of great importance to
observe the consequences of
things;
and as one man may very much
surpass another in attention
and
memory and observation, this will
make a very great difference
in
their reasoning.
2. Where there is
a complication
of causes to produce any effect,
one mind may be much larger
than
another, and better able to
comprehend the whole system
of objects,
and to infer justly their
consequences.
3. One man is able
to carry
on a chain of consequences to a
greater length than another.
4. Few men can
think long
without running into a confusion of ideas,
and mistaking one for
another; and
there are various degrees of this
infirmity.
5. The
circumstance, on which
the effect depends, is frequently
involved in other
circumstances,
which are foreign and extrinsic.
The separation of it often
requires
great attention, accuracy, and
subtilty.
6. The forming of
general
maxims from particular observation is a
very nice operation; and
nothing
is more usual, from haste or a
narrowness of mind, which
sees not
on all sides, than to commit
mistakes in this particular.
7. When we reason
from analogies,
the man, who has the greater
experience or the greater
promptitude
of suggesting analogies, will be
the better reasoner.
8. Byasses from
prejudice,
education, passion, party, &c. hang
more upon one mind than
another.
9. After we have
acquired
a confidence in human testimony, books and
conversation enlarge much
more the
sphere of one man's experience
and thought than those of
another.
It would be easy
to discover
many other circumstances that make a
difference in the
understandings
of men.
85. But though
animals learn
many parts of their knowledge from
observation, there are also
many
parts of it, which they derive from
the original hand of nature;
which
much exceed the share of capacity
they possess on ordinary
occasions;
and in which they improve,
little or nothing, by the
longest
practice and experience. These we
denominate Instincts, and
are so
apt to admire as something very
extraordinary, and
inexplicable
by all the disquisitions of human
understanding. But our
wonder will,
perhaps, cease or diminish, when
we consider, that the
experimental
reasoning itself, which we
possess in common with
beasts, and
on which the whole conduct of
life depends, is nothing but
a species
of instinct or mechanical
power, that acts in us
unknown to
ourselves; and in its chief
operations, is not directed
by any
such relations or comparisons of
ideas, as are the proper
objects
of our intellectual faculties. Though
the instinct be different,
yet still
it is an instinct, which
teaches a man to avoid the
fire;
as much as that, which teaches a
bird, with such exactness,
the art
of incubation, and the whole
economy and order of its
nursery.
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