Sect.
VIII. Of
Liberty and Necessity
PART I.
62. It might
reasonably be
expected in questions which have been
canvassed and disputed with
great
eagerness, since the first origin of
science and philosophy, that
the
meaning of all the terms, at least,
should have been agreed upon
among
the disputants; and our
enquiries, in the course of
two
thousand years, been able to pass from
words to the true and real
subject
of the controversy. For how easy
may it seem to give exact
definitions
of the terms employed in
reasoning, and make these
definitions,
not the mere sound of words,
the object of future
scrutiny and
examination? But if we consider
the matter more narrowly, we
shall
be apt to draw a quite opposite
conclusion. From this
circumstance
alone, that a controversy has
been long kept on foot, and
remains
still undecided, we may presume
that there is some ambiguity
in
the expression, and that the
disputants affix different
ideas
to the terms employed in the
controversy. For as the
faculties
of the mind are supposed to be
naturally alike in every
individual;
otherwise nothing could be more
fruitless than to reason or
dispute
together; it were impossible, if
men affix the same ideas to
their
terms, that they could so long
form different opinions of
the same
subject; especially when they
communicate their views, and
each
party turn themselves on all
sides, in search of
arguments which
may give them the victory over
their antagonists. It is
true, if
men attempt the discussion of
questions which lie entirely
beyond
the reach of human capacity,
such as those concerning the
origin
of worlds, or the economy of the
intellectual system or
region of
spirits, they may long beat the air
in their fruitless contests,
and
never arrive at any determinate
conclusion. But if the
question
regard any subject of common life
and experience, nothing, one
would
think, could preserve the dispute
so long undecided but some
ambiguous
expressions, which keep the
antagonists still at a
distance,
and hinder them from grappling with
each other.
63. This has been
the case
in the long disputed question
concerning liberty and
necessity;
and to so remarkable a degree
that, if I be not much
mistaken,
we shall find, that all mankind, both
learned and ignorant, have
always
been of the same opinion with regard
to this subject, and that a
few
intelligible definitions would
immediately have put an end
to the
whole controversy. I own that
this dispute has been so
much canvassed
on all hands, and has led
philosophers into such a
labyrinth
of obscure sophistry, that it is no
wonder, if a sensible reader
indulge
his ease so far as to turn a deaf
ear to the proposal of such
a question,
from which he can expect
neither instruction or
entertainment.
But the state of the argument
here proposed may, perhaps,
serve
to renew his attention; as it has
more novelty, promises at
least
some decision of the controversy,
and will not much disturb
his ease
by any intricate or obscure
reasoning.
I hope, therefore,
to make
it appear that all men have ever agreed
in the doctrine both of
necessity
and of liberty, according to any
reasonable sense, which can
be put
on these terms; and that the
whole controversy has
hitherto turned
merely upon words. We shall
begin with examining the
doctrine
of necessity.
64. It is
universally allowed
that matter, in all its operations, is
actuated by a necessary
force, and
that every natural effect is so
precisely determined by the
energy
of its cause that no other
effect, in such particular
circumstances,
could possibly have resulted
from it. The degree and
direction
of every motion is, by the laws of
nature, prescribed with such
exactness
that a living creature may as
soon arise from the shock of
two
bodies in motion in any other
degree or direction than
what is
actually produced by it. Would we,
therefore, form a just and
precise
idea of necessity, we must consider
whence that idea arises when
we
apply it to the operation of bodies.
It seems evident
that, if
all the scenes of nature were
continually shifted in such
a manner
that no two events bore any
resemblance to each other,
but every
object was entirely new,
without any similitude to
whatever
had been seen before, we should
never, in that case, have
attained
the least idea of necessity, or
of a connexion among these
objects.
We might say, upon such a
supposition, that one object
or
event has followed another; not that
one was produced by the
other. The
relation of cause and effect must
be utterly unknown to
mankind. Inference
and reasoning concerning
the operations of nature
would,
from that moment, be at an end; and
the memory and senses remain
the
only canals, by which the knowledge
of any real existence could
possibly
have access to the mind. Our
idea, therefore, of
necessity and
causation arises entirely from the
uniformity observable in the
operations
of nature, where similar
objects are constantly
conjoined
together, and the mind is
determined by custom to
infer the
one from the appearance of the
other. These two
circumstances form
the whole of that necessity, which
we ascribe to matter. Beyond
the
constant conjunction of similar
objects, and the consequent
inference
from one to the other, we have
no notion of any necessity
or connexion.
If it appear,
therefore, that
all mankind have ever allowed, without
any doubt or hesitation,
that these
two circumstances take place in
the voluntary actions of
men, and
in the operations of mind; it must
follow, that all mankind
have ever
agreed in the doctrine of
necessity, and that they
have hitherto
disputed, merely for not
understanding each other.
65. As to the
first circumstance,
the constant and regular
conjunction of similar
events, we
may possibly satisfy ourselves by
the following
considerations. It
is universally acknowledged that
there is a great uniformity
among
the actions of men, in all nations
and ages, and that human
nature
remains still the same, in its
principles and operations.
The same
motives always produce the same
actions: The same events
follow
from the same causes. Ambition,
avarice, self-love, vanity,
friendship,
generosity, public spirit:
these passions, mixed in
various
degrees, and distributed through
society, have been, from the
beginning
of the world, and still are,
the source of all the
actions and
enterprises, which have ever been
observed among mankind.
Would you
know the sentiments, inclinations,
and course of life of the
Greeks
and Romans? Study well the temper and
actions of the French and
English:
You cannot be much mistaken in
transferring to the former
most
of the observations which you have
made with regard to the
latter.
Mankind are so much the same, in all
times and places, that
history informs
us of nothing new or strange in
this particular. Its chief
use is
only to discover the constant and
universal principles of
human nature,
by showing men in all
varieties of circumstances
and situations,
and furnishing us with
materials from which we may
form
our observations and become
acquainted with the regular
springs
of human action and behaviour.
These records of wars,
intrigues,
factions, and revolutions, are so
many collections of
experiments,
by which the politician or moral
philosopher fixes the
principles
of his science, in the same manner as
the physician or natural
philosopher
becomes acquainted with the
nature of plants, minerals,
and
other external objects, by the
experiments which he forms
concerning
them. Nor are the earth,
water, and other elements,
examined
by Aristotle, and Hippocrates,
more like to those which at
present
lie under our observation than the
men described by Polybius
and Tacitus
are to those who now govern
the world.
Should a
traveller, returning
from a far country, bring us an
account of men, wholly
different
from any with whom we were ever
acquainted; men, who were
entirely
divested of avarice, ambition, or
revenge; who knew no
pleasure but
friendship, generosity, and public
spirit; we should
immediately, from
these circumstances, detect the
falsehood, and prove him a
liar,
with the same certainty as if he
had stuffed his narration
with stories
of centaurs and dragons,
miracles and prodigies. And
if we
would explode any forgery in
history, we cannot make use
of a
more convincing argument, than to
prove, that the actions
ascribed
to any person are directly contrary
to the course of nature, and
that
no human motives, in such
circumstances, could ever
induce
him to such a conduct. The veracity
of Quintus Curtius is as
much to
be suspected when he describes the
supernatural courage of
Alexander,
by which he was hurried on singly
to attack multitudes, as
when he
describes his supernatural force
and activity, by which he
was able
to resist them. So readily and
universally do we
acknowledge a
uniformity in human motives and
actions as well as in the
operations
of body.
Hence likewise the
benefit
of that experience, acquired by long life
and a variety of business
and company,
in order to instruct us in
the principles of human
nature,
and regulate our future conduct, as
well as speculation. By
means of
this guide, we mount up to the
knowledge of men's
inclinations
and motives, from their actions,
expressions, and even
gestures;
and again descend to the
interpretation of their
actions
from our knowledge of their motives
and inclinations. The
general observations
treasured up by a course of
experience, give us the clue
of
human nature, and teach us to
unravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts
and appearances no longer
deceive us. Public
declarations
pass for the specious colouring of a
cause. And though virtue and
honour
be allowed their proper weight and
authority, that perfect
disinterestedness,
so often pretended to, is
never expected in multitudes
and
parties; seldom in their leaders; and
scarcely even in individuals
of
any rank or station. But were there no
uniformity in human actions,
and
were every experiment which we
could form of this kind
irregular
and anomalous, it were impossible to
collect any general
observations
concerning mankind; and no
experience, however
accurately digested
by reflection, would ever
serve to any purpose. Why is
the
aged husband-man more skilful in
his calling than the young
beginner
but because there is a certain
uniformity in the operation
of the
sun, rain, and earth towards the
production of vegetables;
and experience
teaches the old
practitioner the rules by
which
this operation is governed and
directed.
66. We must not,
however,
expect that this uniformity of human
actions should be carried to
such
a length as that all men, in the
same circumstances, will
always
act precisely in the same manner,
without making any allowance
for
the diversity of characters,
prejudices, and opinions.
Such a
uniformity in every particular, is
found in no part of nature.
On the
contrary, from observing the
variety of conduct in
different
men, we are enabled to form a
greater variety of maxims,
which
still suppose a degree of
uniformity and regularity.
Are the manners of
men different
in different ages and countries? We
learn thence the great force
of
custom and education, which mould
the human mind from its
infancy
and form it into a fixed and
established character. Is
the behaviour
and conduct of the one sex
very unlike that of the
other? Is
it thence we become acquainted
with the different
characters which
nature has impressed upon the
sexes, and which she
preserves with
constancy and regularity? Are
the actions of the same
person much
diversified in the different
periods of his life, from
infancy
to old age? This affords room for
many general observations
concerning
the gradual change of our
sentiments and inclinations,
and
the different maxims which prevail in
the different ages of human
creatures.
Even the characters, which
are peculiar to each
individual,
have a uniformity in their influence;
otherwise our acquaintance
with
the persons and our observation of
their conduct could never
teach
us their dispositions, or serve to
direct our behaviour with
regard
to them.
67. I grant it
possible to
find some actions, which seem to have
no regular connexion with
any known
motives, and are exceptions to all
the measures of conduct
which have
ever been established for the
government of men. But if we
would
willingly know what judgement
should be formed of such
irregular
and extraordinary actions, we may
consider the sentiments
commonly
entertained with regard to those
irregular events which
appear in
the course of nature, and the
operations of external
objects.
All causes are not conjoined to
their usual effects with
like uniformity.
An artificer, who handles
only dead matter, may be
disappointed
of his aim, as well as the
politician, who directs the
conduct
of sensible and intelligent
agents.
The vulgar, who
take things
according to their first appearance,
attribute the uncertainty of
events
to such an uncertainty in the
causes as makes the latter
often
fail of their usual influence; though
they meet with no impediment
in
their operation. But philosophers,
observing that, almost in
every
part of nature, there is contained a
vast variety of springs and
principles,
which are hid, by reason of
their minuteness or
remoteness,
find, that it is at least possible the
contrariety of events may
not proceed
from any contingency in the
cause, but from the secret
operation
of contrary causes. This
possibility is converted
into certainty
by farther observation, when
they remark that, upon an
exact
scrutiny, a contrariety of effects
always betrays a contrariety
of
causes, and proceeds from their mutual
opposition. A peasant can
give no
better reason for the stopping of
any clock or watch than to
say that
it does not commonly go right: But
an artist easily perceives
that
the same force in the spring or
pendulum has always the same
influence
on the wheels; but fails of its
usual effect, perhaps by
reason
of a grain of dust, which puts a
stop to the whole movement.
From
the observation of several parallel
instances, philosophers form
a maxim
that the connexion between all
causes and effects is
equally necessary,
and that its seeming
uncertainty in some
instances proceeds
from the secret opposition of
contrary causes.
Thus, for
instance, in the
human body, when the usual symptoms of
health or sickness
disappoint our
expectation; when medicines
operate not with their
wonted powers;
when irregular events follow
from any particular cause;
the philosopher
and physician are not
surprised at the matter, nor
are
ever tempted to deny, in general, the
necessity and uniformity of
those
principles by which the animal
economy is conducted. They
know
that a human body is a mighty
complicated machine: That
many secret
powers lurk in it, which are
altogether beyond our
comprehension:
That to us it must often appear
very uncertain in its
operations:
And that therefore the irregular
events, which outwardly
discover
themselves, can be no proof that
the laws of nature are not
observed
with the greatest regularity in
its internal operations and
government.
68. The
philosopher, if he
be consistent, must apply the same
reasoning to the actions and
volitions
of intelligent agents. The most
irregular and unexpected
resolutions
of men may frequently be
accounted for by those who
know
every particular circumstance of their
character and situation. A
person
of an obliging disposition gives a
peevish answer: But he has
the toothache,
or has not dined. A stupid
fellow discovers an uncommon
alacrity
in his carriage: But he has
met with a sudden piece of
good
fortune. Or even when an action, as
sometimes happens, cannot be
particularly
accounted for, either by the
person himself or by others;
we
know, in general, that the
characters of men are, to a
certain
degree, inconstant and
irregular. This is, in a
manner,
the constant character of human
nature; though it be
applicable,
in a more particular manner, to
some persons who have no
fixed rule
for their conduct, but proceed
in a continued course of
caprice
and inconstancy. The internal
principles and motives may
operate
in a uniform manner,
notwithstanding these
seeming irregularities;
in the same manner as
the winds, rain, clouds, and
other
variations of the weather are
supposed to be governed by
steady
principles; though not easily
discoverable by human
sagacity and
enquiry.
69. Thus it
appears, not only
that the conjunction between motives
and voluntary actions is as
regular
and uniform as that between the
cause and effect in any part
of
nature; but also that this regular
conjunction has been
universally
acknowledged among mankind, and has
never been the subject of
dispute,
either in philosophy or common
life. Now, as it is from
past experience
that we draw all inferences
concerning the future, and
as we
conclude that objects will always
be conjoined together which
we find
to have always been conjoined;
it may seem superfluous to
prove
that this experienced uniformity in
human actions is a source
whence
we draw inferences concerning them.
But in order to throw the
argument
into a greater variety of lights we
shall also insist, though
briefly,
on this latter topic.
The mutual
dependence of men
is so great in all societies that
scarce any human action is
entirely
complete in itself, or is
performed without some
reference
to the actions of others, which are
requisite to make it answer
fully
the intention of the agent. The
poorest artificer, who
labours alone,
expects at least the
protection of the
magistrate, to
ensure him the enjoyment of the
fruits of his labour. He
also expects
that, when he carries his
goods to market, and offers
them
at a reasonable price, he shall
find purchasers, and shall
be able,
by the money he acquires, to
engage others to supply him
with
those commodities which are requisite
for his subsistence. In
proportion
as men extend their dealings, and
render their intercourse
with others
more complicated, they always
comprehend, in their schemes
of
life, a greater variety of voluntary
actions, which they expect,
from
the proper motives, to co-operate
with their own. In all these
conclusions
they take their measures from
past experience, in the same
manner
as in their reasonings
concerning external objects;
and
firmly believe that men, as well as
all the elements, are to
continue,
in their operations, the same
that they have ever found
them.
A manufacturer reckons upon the labour
of his servants for the
execution
of any work as much as upon the
tools which he employs, and
would
be equally surprised were his
expectations disappointed.
In short,
this experimental inference and
reasoning concerning the
actions
of others enters so much into human
life that no man, while
awake, is
ever a moment without employing
it. Have we not reason,
therefore,
to affirm that all mankind have
always agreed in the
doctrine of
necessity according to the
foregoing definition and
explication
of it?
70. Nor have
philosophers
ever entertained a different opinion
from the people in this
particular.
For, not to mention that almost
every action of their life
supposes
that opinion, there are even few
of the speculative parts of
learning
to which it is not essential.
What would become of
history, had
we not a dependence on the
veracity of the historian
according
to the experience which we have
had of mankind? How could
politics
be a science, if laws and forms
of government had not a
uniform
influence upon society? Where would be
the foundation of morals, if
particular
characters had no certain or
determinate power to produce
particular
sentiments, and if these
sentiments had no constant
operation
on actions? And with what
pretence could we employ our
criticism
upon any poet or polite author,
if we could not pronounce
the conduct
and sentiments of his actors
either natural or unnatural
to such
characters, and in such
circumstances? It seems
almost impossible,
therefore, to engage either
in science or action of any
kind
without acknowledging the doctrine of
necessity, and this
inference from
motive to voluntary actions, from
characters to conduct.
And indeed, when
we consider
how aptly natural and moral evidence
link together, and form only
one
chain of argument, we shall make no
scruple to allow that they
are of
the same nature, and derived from
the same principles. A
prisoner
who has neither money nor interest,
discovers the impossibility
of his
escape, as well when he considers
the obstinacy of the gaoler,
as
the walls and bars with which he is
surrounded; and, in all
attempts
for his freedom, chooses rather to
work upon the stone and iron
of
the one, than upon the inflexible
nature of the other. The
same prisoner,
when conducted to the
scaffold, foresees his death
as
certainly from the constancy and
fidelity of his guards, as
from
the operation of the axe or wheel. His
mind runs along a certain
train
of ideas: The refusal of the
soldiers to consent to his
escape;
the action of the executioner;
the separation of the head
and body;
bleeding, convulsive motions, and
death. Here is a connected
chain
of natural causes and voluntary
actions; but the mind feels
no difference
between them in passing from
one link to another: Nor is
less
certain of the future event than if
it were connected with the
objects
present to the memory or senses, by
a train of causes, cemented
together
by what we are pleased to call
a physical necessity. The
same experienced
union has the same effect
on the mind, whether the
united
objects be motives, volition, and
actions; or figure and
motion. We
may change the name of things; but
their nature and their
operation
on the understanding never change.
Were a man, whom I
know to
be honest and opulent, and with whom I
live in intimate friendship,
to
come into my house, where I am
surrounded with my servants,
I rest
assured that he is not to stab
me before he leaves it in
order
to rob me of my silver standish; and I
no more suspect this event
than
the falling of the house itself, which
is new, and solidly built
and founded.-
But he may have been seized
with a sudden and unknown
frenzy.-
So may a sudden earthquake arise,
and shake and tumble my
house about
my ears. I shall therefore
change the suppositions. I
shall
say that I know with certainty that
he is not to put his hand
into the
fire and hold it there till it be
consumed: And this event, I
think
I can foretell with the same
assurance, as that, if he
throw
himself out at the window, and meet
with no obstruction, he will
not
remain a moment suspended in the air.
No suspicion of an unknown
frenzy
can give the least possibility to
the former event, which is
so contrary
to all the known principles
of human nature. A man who
at noon
leaves his purse full of gold on
the pavement at Charing
Cross, may
as well expect that it will fly
away like a feather, as that
he
will find it untouched an hour
after. Above one half of
human reasonings
contain inferences of a
similar nature, attended
with more
or less degrees of certainty
proportioned to our
experience of
the usual conduct of mankind in such
particular situations.
71. I have
frequently considered,
what could possibly be the
reason why all mankind,
though they
have ever, without hesitation,
acknowledged the doctrine of
necessity
in their whole practice and
reasoning, have yet
discovered such
a reluctance to acknowledge it
in words, and have rather
shown
a propensity, in all ages, to
profess the contrary
opinion. The
matter, I think, may be accounted
for after the following
manner.
If we examine the operations of
body, and the production of
effects
from their causes, we shall find
that all our faculties can
never
carry us farther in our knowledge
of this relation than barely
to
observe that particular objects are
constantly conjoined
together, and
that the mind is carried, by a
customary transition, from
the appearance
of one to the belief of
the other. But though this
conclusion
concerning human ignorance be
the result of the strictest
scrutiny
of this subject, men still
entertain a strong
propensity to
believe that they penetrate farther
into the powers of nature,
and perceive
something like a necessary
connexion between the cause
and
the effect. When again they turn their
reflections towards the
operations
of their own minds, and feel no
such connexion of the motive
and
the action; they are thence apt to
suppose, that there is a
difference
between the effects which result
from material force, and
those which
arise from thought and
intelligence. But being once
convinced
that we know nothing farther of
causation of any kind than
merely
the constant conjunction of objects,
and the consequent inference
of
the mind from one to another, and
finding that these two
circumstances
are universally allowed to have
place in voluntary actions;
we may
be more easily led to own the
same necessity common to all
causes.
And though this reasoning may
contradict the systems of
many philosophers,
in ascribing necessity to
the determinations of the
will,
we shall find, upon reflection, that
they dissent from it in
words only,
not in their real sentiment.
Necessity, according to the
sense
in which it is here taken, has never
yet been rejected, nor can
ever,
I think, be rejected by any
philosopher. It may only,
perhaps,
be pretended that the mind can
perceive, in the operations
of matter,
some farther connexion
between the cause and
effect; and
connexion that has not place in
voluntary actions of
intelligent
beings. Now whether it be so or
not, can only appear upon
examination;
and it is incumbent on these
philosophers to make good
their
assertion, by defining or describing
that necessity, and pointing
it
out to us in the operations of
material causes.
72. It would seem,
indeed,
that men begin at the wrong end of this
question concerning liberty
and
necessity, when they enter upon it
by examining the faculties
of the
soul, the influence of the
understanding, and the
operations
of the will. Let them first
discuss a more simple
question,
namely, the operations of body and
of brute unintelligent
matter; and
try whether they can there form any
idea of causation and
necessity,
except that of a constant conjunction
of objects, and subsequent
inference
of the mind from one to
another. If these
circumstances
form, in reality, the whole of that
necessity, which we conceive
in
matter, and if these circumstances
be also universally
acknowledged
to take place in the operations of
the mind, the dispute is at
an end;
at least, must be owned to be
thenceforth merely verbal.
But as
long as we will rashly suppose, that
we have some farther idea of
necessity
and causation in the operations
of external objects; at the
same
time, that we can find nothing
farther in the voluntary
actions
of the mind; there is no
possibility of bringing the
question
to any determinate issue, while
we proceed upon so erroneous
a supposition.
The only method of
undeceiving us is to mount
up higher;
to examine the narrow extent
of science when applied to
material
causes; and to convince
ourselves that all we know
of them
is the constant conjunction and
inference above mentioned.
We may,
perhaps, find that it is with
difficulty we are induced to
fix
such narrow limits to human
understanding: But we can
afterwards
find no difficulty when we come
to apply this doctrine to
the actions
of the will. For as it is
evident that these have a
regular
conjunction with motives and
circumstances and
characters, and
as we always draw inferences from
one to the other, we must be
obliged
to acknowledge in words that
necessity, which we have
already
avowed, in every deliberation of
our lives, and in every step
of
our conduct and behaviour.*
* The prevalence
of the doctrine
of liberty may be accounted for,
from another cause, viz. a
false
sensation or seeming experience which
we have, or may have, of
liberty
or indifference, in many of our
actions. The necessity of
any action,
whether of matter or of mind, is
not, properly speaking, a
quality
in the agent, but in any thinking or
intelligent being, who may
consider
the action; and it consists
chiefly in the determination
of
his thoughts to infer the existence of
that action from some
preceding
objects; as liberty, when opposed to
necessity, is nothing but
the want
of that determination, and a
certain looseness or
indifference,
which we feel, in passing, or not
passing, from the idea of
one object
to that of any succeeding one.
Now we may observe, that,
though,
in reflecting on human actions, we
seldom feel such a
looseness, or
indifference, but are commonly able
to infer them with
considerable
certainty from their motives, and from
the dispositions of the
agent; yet
it frequently happens, that, in
performing the actions
themselves,
we are sensible of something like
it: And as all resembling
objects
are readily taken for each other,
this has been employed as a
demonstrative
and even intuitive proof
of human liberty. We feel,
that
our actions are subject to our will,
on most occasions; and
imagine we
feel, that the will itself is
subject to nothing, because,
when
by a denial of it we are provoked to
try, we feel, that it moves
easily
every way, and produces an image of
itself (or a Velleity, as it
is
called in the schools) even on that
side, on which it did not
settle.
This image, or faint motion, we
persuade ourselves, could,
at that
time, have been compleated into the
thing itself; because,
should that
be denied, we find, upon a second
trial, that, at present, it
can.
We consider not, that the fantastical
desire of shewing liberty,
is here
the motive of our actions. And it
seems certain, that, however
we
may imagine we feel a liberty within
ourselves, a spectator can
commonly
infer our actions from our motives
and character; and even
where he
cannot, he concludes in general, that
he might, were he perfectly
acquainted
with every circumstance of
our situation and temper,
and the
most secret springs of our
complexion and disposition.
Now
this is the very essence of necessity,
according to the foregoing
doctrine.
73. But to proceed
in this
reconciling project with regard to the
question of liberty and
necessity;
the most contentious question of
metaphysics, the most
contentious
science; it will not require many
words to prove, that all
mankind
have ever agreed in the doctrine of
liberty as well as in that
of necessity,
and that the whole dispute,
in this respect also, has
been hitherto
merely verbal. For what is
meant by liberty, when
applied to
voluntary actions? We cannot
surely mean that actions
have so
little connexion with motives,
inclinations, and
circumstances,
that one does not follow with a
certain degree of uniformity
from
the other, and that one affords no
inference by which we can
conclude
the existence of the other. For
these are plain and
acknowledged
matters of fact. By liberty, then, we
can only mean a power of
acting
or not acting, according to the
determinations of the will;
that
is, if we choose to remain at rest,
we may; if we choose to
move, we
also may. Now this hypothetical
liberty is universally
allowed to
belong to every one who is not a
prisoner and in chains.
Here, then,
is no subject of dispute.
74. Whatever
definition we
may give of liberty, we should be careful
to observe two requisite
circumstances;
first, that it be consistent
with plain matter of fact;
secondly,
that it be consistent with
itself. If we observe these
circumstances,
and render our definition
intelligible, I am persuaded
that
all mankind will be found of one
opinion with regard to it.
It is universally
allowed
that nothing exists without a cause of its
existence, and that chance,
when
strictly examined, is a mere negative
word, and means not any real
power
which has anywhere a being in
nature. But it is pretended
that
some causes are necessary, some not
necessary. Here then is the
advantage
of definitions. Let any one
define a cause, without
comprehending,
as a part of the definition,
a necessary connexion with
its effect;
and let him show distinctly the
origin of the idea,
expressed by
the definition; and I shall readily
give up the whole
controversy. But
if the foregoing explication of the
matter be received, this
must be
absolutely impracticable. Had not
objects a regular
conjunction with
each other, we should never have
entertained any notion of
cause
and effect; and this regular
conjunction produces that
inference
of the understanding, which is the
only connexion, that we can
have
any comprehension of. Whoever
attempts a definition of
cause,
exclusive of these circumstances, will
be obliged either to employ
unintelligible
terms or such as are
synonymous to the term which
he
endeavours to define.* And if the
definition above mentioned
be admitted;
liberty, when opposed to
necessity, not to
constraint, is
the same thing with chance; which
is universally allowed to
have no
existence.
* Thus, if a cause
be defined,
that which produces any thing; it
is easy to observe, that
producing
is synonimous to causing. In like
manner, if a cause be
defined, that
by which any thing exists; this is
liable to the same
objection. For
what is meant by these words, by
which? Had it been said,
that a
cause is that after which any thing
constantly exists; we should
have
understood the terms. For this is,
indeed, all we know of the
matter.
And this constancy forms the very
essence of necessity, nor
have we
any other idea of it.
PART II.
75. There is no
method of
reasoning more common, and yet none more
blameable, than, in
philosophical
disputes, to endeavour the
refutation of any
hypothesis, by
a pretence of its dangerous
consequences to religion and
morality.
When any opinion leads to
absurdities, it is certainly
false;
but it is not certain that an
opinion is false, because it
is
of dangerous consequence. Such topics,
therefore, ought entirely to
be
forborne; as serving nothing to the
discovery of truth, but only
to
make the person of an antagonist
odious. This I observe in
general,
without pretending to draw any
advantage from it. I frankly
submit
to an examination of this kind,
and shall venture to affirm
that
the doctrines, both of necessity
and of liberty, as above
explained,
are not only consistent with
morality, but are absolutely
essential
to its support.
Necessity may be
defined two
ways, conformably to the two
definitions of cause, of
which it
makes an essential part. It consists
either in the constant
conjunction
of like objects or in the inference
of the understanding from
one object
to another. Now necessity, in
both these senses, (which,
indeed,
are at bottom the same) has
universally, though tacitly,
in
the schools, in the pulpit, and in
common life, been allowed to
belong
to the will of man; and no one has
ever pretended to deny that
we can
draw inferences concerning human
actions, and that those
inferences
are founded on the experienced
union of like actions, with
like
motives, inclinations, and
circumstances. The only
particular
in which any one can differ, is,
that either, perhaps, he
will refuse
to give the name of necessity
to this property of human
actions:
But as long as the meaning is
understood, I hope the word
can
do no harm: Or that he will maintain
it possible to discover
something
farther in the operations of matter.
But this, it must be
acknowledged,
can be of no consequence to
morality or religion,
whatever it
may be to natural philosophy or
metaphysics. We may here be
mistaken
in asserting that there is no
idea of any other necessity
or connexion
in the actions of body: But
surely we ascribe nothing to
the
actions of the mind, but what
everyone does, and must
readily
allow of. We change no circumstance in
the received orthodox system
with
regard to the will, but only in that
with regard to material
objects
and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be
more innocent, at least,
than this
doctrine.
76. All laws being
founded
on rewards and punishments, it is
supposed as a fundamental
principle,
that these motives have a regular
and uniform influence on the
mind,
and both produce the good and
prevent the evil actions. We
may
give to this influence what name we
please; but as it is usually
conjoined
with the action, it must be
esteemed a cause, and be
looked
upon as an instance of that necessity,
which we would here
establish.
The only proper
object of
hatred or vengeance is a person or
creature, endowed with
thought and
consciousness; and when any
criminal or injurious
actions excite
that passion, it is only by their
relation to the person, or
connexion
with him. Actions are, by their
very nature, temporary and
perishing;
and where they proceed not
from some cause in the
character
and disposition of the person who
performed them, they can
neither
redound to his honour, if good; nor
infamy if evil. The actions
themselves
may be blameable; they may be
contrary to all the rules of
morality
and religion: But the person
is not answerable for them;
and
as they proceeded from nothing in
him that is durable and
constant,
and leave nothing of that nature
behind them, it is
impossible he
can, upon their account, become the
object of punishment or
vengeance.
According to the principle,
therefore, which denies
necessity,
and consequently causes, a man is
as pure and untainted, after
having
committed the most horrid crime,
as at the first moment of
his birth,
nor is his character anywise
concerned in his actions,
since
they are not derived from it, and
the wickedness of the one
can never
be used as a proof of the
depravity of the other.
Men are not blamed
for such
actions as they perform ignorantly and
casually, whatever may be
the consequences.
Why? but because the
principles of these actions
are
only momentary, and terminate in
them alone. Men are less
blamed
for such actions as they perform
hastily and unpremeditately
than
for such as proceed from
deliberation. For what
reason? but
because a hasty temper, though a
constant cause or principle
in the
mind, operates only by intervals,
and infects not the whole
character.
Again, repentance wipes off every
crime, if attended with a
reformation
of life and manners. How is this
to be accounted for? but by
asserting
that actions render a person
criminal merely as they are
proofs
of criminal principles in the mind;
and when, by an alteration
of these
principles, they cease to be
just proofs, they likewise
cease
to be criminal. But, except upon
the doctrine of necessity,
they
never were just proofs, and
consequently never were
criminal.
77. It will be
equally easy
to prove, and from the same arguments,
that liberty, according to
that
definition above mentioned, in which
all men agree is also
essential
to morality, and that no human
actions, where it is
wanting, are
susceptible of any moral
qualities, or can be the
objects
either of approbation or dislike. For
as actions are objects of
our moral
sentiment, so far only as they are
indications of the internal
character,
passions, and affections; it is
impossible that they can
give rise
either to praise or blame, where
they proceed not from these
principles,
but are derived altogether
from external violence.
78. I pretend not
to have
obviated or removed all objections to this
theory, with regard to
necessity
and liberty. I can foresee other
objections, derived from
topics
which have not here been treated of.
It may be said, for
instance, that,
if voluntary actions be
subjected to the same laws
of necessity
with the operations of matter,
there is a continued chain
of necessary
causes, preordained and
pre-determined, reaching
from the
original cause of all to every
single volition of every
human creature.
No contingency anywhere in
the universe; no
indifference; no
liberty. While we act, we are, at
the same time, acted upon.
The ultimate
Author of all our volitions is
the Creator of the world,
who first
bestowed motion on this immense
machine, and placed all
beings in
that particular position, whence
every subsequent event, by
an inevitable
necessity, must result. Human
actions, therefore, either
can have
no moral turpitude at all, as
proceeding from so good a
cause;
or if they have any turpitude, they
must involve our Creator in
the
same guilt, while he is acknowledged
to be their ultimate cause
and author.
For as a man, who fired a mine,
is answerable for all the
consequences
whether the train he employed
be long or short; so
wherever a
continued chain of necessary causes is
fixed, that Being, either
finite
or infinite, who produces the
first, is likewise the
author of
all the rest, and must both bear
the blame and acquire the
praise
which belong to them. Our clear and
unalterable ideas of
morality establish
this rule, upon unquestionable
reasons, when we examine the
consequences
of any human action; and
these reasons must still
have greater
force when applied to the
volitions and intentions of
a Being
infinitely wise and powerful.
Ignorance or importence may
be pleaded
for so limited a creature as
man; but those imperfections
have
no place in our Creator. He foresaw,
he ordained, he intended all
those
actions of men, which we so
rashly pronounce criminal.
And we
must therefore conclude, either that
they are not criminal, or
that the
Deity, not man, is accountable
for them. But as either of
these
positions is absurd and impious, it
follows, that the doctrine
from
which they are deduced cannot possibly
be true, as being liable to
all
the same objections. An absurd
consequence, if necessary,
proves
the original doctrine to be
absurd; in the same manner
as criminal
actions render criminal the
original cause, if the
connexion
between them be necessary and
evitable.
This objection
consists of
two parts, which we shall examine
separately; First, that, if
human
actions can be traced up, by a
necessary chain, to the
Deity, they
can never be criminal; on
account of the infinite
perfection
of that Being from whom they are
derived, and who can intend
nothing
but what is altogether good and
laudable. Or, Secondly, if
they
be criminal, we must retract the
attribute of perfection,
which we
ascribe to the Deity, and must
acknowledge him to be the
ultimate
author of guilt and moral turpitude
in all his creatures.
79. The answer to
the first
objection seems obvious and
convincing. There are many
philosophers
who, after an exact scrutiny
of all the phenomena of
nature,
conclude, that the WHOLE, considered
as one system, is, in every
period
of its existence, ordered with
perfect benevolence; and
that the
utmost possible happiness will, in
the end, result to all
created beings,
without any mixture of positive
or absolute ill or misery.
Every
physical ill, say they, makes an
essential part of this
benevolent
system, and could not possibly be
removed, even by the Deity
himself,
considered as a wise agent,
without giving entrance to
greater
ill, or excluding greater good,
which will result from it.
From
this theory, some philosophers, and
the ancient Stoics among the
rest,
derived a topic of consolation
under all afflictions, while
they
taught their pupils that those
ills under which they
laboured were,
in reality, goods to the
universe; and that to an
enlarged
view, which could comprehend the
whole system of nature,
every event
became an object of joy and
exultation. But though this
topic
be specious and sublime, it was soon
found in practice weak and
ineffectual.
You would surely more irritate
than appease a man lying
under the
racking pains of the gout by
preaching up to him the
rectitude
of those general laws, which
produced the malignant
humours in
his body, and led them through the
proper canals, to the sinews
and
nerves, where they now excite such
acute torments. These
enlarged views
may, for a moment, please the
imagination of a speculative
man,
who is placed in ease and
security; but neither can
they dwell
with constancy on his mind,
even though undisturbed by
the emotions
of pain or passion; much
less can they maintain their
ground
when attacked by such powerful
antagonists. The affections
take
a narrower and more natural survey of
their object; and by an
economy,
more suitable to the infirmity of
human minds, regard alone
the beings
around us, and are actuated by
such events as appear good
or ill
to the private system.
80. The case is
the same with
moral as with physical ill. It
cannot reasonably be
supposed, that
those remote considerations, which
are found of so little
efficacy
with regard to one, will have a more
powerful influence with
regard to
the other. The mind of man is so
formed by nature that, upon
the
appearance of certain characters,
dispositions, and actions,
it immediately
feels the sentiment of
approbation or blame; nor
are there
any emotions more essential to its
frame and constitution. The
characters
which engage our approbation
are chiefly such as
contribute to
the peace and security of human
society; as the characters
which
excite blame are chiefly such as tend
to public detriment and
disturbance:
Whence it may reasonably be
presumed, that the moral
sentiments
arise, either mediately or
immediately, from a
reflection of
these opposite interests. What
though philosophical
meditations
establish a different opinion or
conjecture; that everything
is right
with regard to the WHOLE, and
that the qualities, which
disturb
society, are, in the main, as
beneficial, and are as
suitable
to the primary intention of nature
as those which more directly
promote
its happiness and welfare? Are
such remote and uncertain
speculations
able to counterbalance the
sentiments which arise from
the
natural and immediate view of the
objects? A man who is robbed
of
a considerable sum; does he find his
vexation for the loss
anywise diminished
by these sublime reflections?
Why then should his moral
resentment
against the crime be supposed
incompatible with them? Or
why should
not the acknowledgement of a
real distinction between
vice and
virtue be reconcileable to all
speculative systems of
philosophy,
as well as that of a real
distinction between personal
beauty
and deformity? Both these
distinctions are founded in
the
natural sentiments of the human
mind: And these sentiments
are not
to be controuled or altered by
any philosophical theory or
speculation
whatsoever.
81. The second
objection admits
not of so easy and satisfactory an
answer; nor is it possible
to explain
distinctly, how the Deity can be
the mediate cause of all the
actions
of men, without being the
author of sin and moral
turpitude.
These are mysteries, which mere
natural and unassisted
reason is
very unfit to handle; and whatever
system she embraces, she
must find
herself involved in inextricable
difficulties, and even
contradictions,
at every step which she takes
with regard to such
subjects. To
reconcile the indifference and
contingency of human actions
with
prescience; or to defend absolute
decrees, and yet free the
Deity
from being the author of sin, has been
found hitherto to exceed all
the
power of philosophy. Happy, if she be
thence sensible of her
temerity,
when she pries into these sublime
mysteries; and leaving a
scene so
full of obscurities and
perplexities, return, with
suitable
modesty, to her true and proper
province, the examination of
common
life; where she will find
difficulties enough to
employ her
enquiries, without launching into so
boundless an ocean of doubt,
uncertainty,
and contradiction!
![[Renascence Editions]](http://www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/ren.gif)
