Sect.
XII. Of
the academical or sceptical Philosophy
PART I.
116. There is not
a greater
number of philosophical reasonings,
displayed upon any subject,
than
those, which prove the existence of a
Deity, and refute the
fallacies
of Atheists; and yet the most
religious philosophers still
dispute
whether any man can be so blinded
as to be a speculative
atheist.
How shall we reconcile these
contradictions? The
knights-errant,
who wandered about to clear the
world of dragons and giants,
never
entertained the least doubt with
regard to the existence of
these
monsters.
The Sceptic is
another enemy
of religion, who naturally provokes the
indignation of all divines
and graver
philosophers; though it is
certain, that no man ever
met with
any such absurd creature, or
conversed with a man, who
had no
opinion or principle concerning any
subject, either of action or
speculation.
This begets a very natural
question; What is meant by a
sceptic?
And how far it is possible to
push these philosophical
principles
of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species
of scepticism,
antecedent to all study and
philosophy, which is much
inculcated
by Des Cartes and others, as a
sovereign preservative
against error
and precipitate judgement. It
recommends an universal
doubt, not
only of all our former opinions and
principles, but also of our
very
faculties; of whose veracity, say
they, we must assure
ourselves,
by a chain of reasoning, deduced
from some original
principle, which
cannot possibly be fallacious or
deceitful. But neither is
there
any such original principle which
has a prerogative above
others,
that are self-evident and
convincing: or if there
were, could
we advance a step beyond it, but
by the use of those very
faculties,
of which we are supposed to be
already diffident. The
Cartesian
doubt, therefore, were it ever
possible to be attained by
any human
creature (as it plainly is not)
would be entirely incurable;
and
no reasoning could ever bring us to a
state of assurance and
conviction
upon any subject.
It must, however,
be confessed,
that this species of scepticism,
when more moderate, may be
understood
in a very reasonable sense,
and is a necessary
preparative to
the study of philosophy, by
preserving a proper
impartiality
in our judgements, and weaning our
mind from all those
prejudices,
which we may have imbibed from
education or rash opinion.
To begin
with clear and self-evident
principles, to advance by
timorous
and sure steps, to review
frequently our conclusions,
and
examine accurately all their
consequences; though by
these means
we shall make both a slow and a
short progress in our
systems; are
the only methods, by which we can
ever hope to reach truth,
and attain
a proper stability and
certainty in our
determinations.
117. There is
another species
of scepticism, consequent to science
and enquiry, when men are
supposed
to have discovered, either the
absolute fallaciousness of
their
mental faculties, or their
unfitness to reach any fixed
determination
in all those curious
subjects of speculation,
about which
they are commonly employed.
Even our very senses are
brought
into dispute, by a certain species of
philosophers; and the maxims
of
common life are subjected to the
same doubt as the most
profound
principles or conclusions of
metaphysics and theology. As
these
paradoxical tenets (if they may
be called tenets) are to be
met
with in some philosophers, and the
refutation of them in
several, they
naturally excite our curiosity,
and make us enquire into the
arguments,
on which they may be founded.
I need not insist
upon the
more trite topics, employed by the
sceptics in all ages,
against the
evidence of sense; such as those
which are derived from the
imperfection
and fallaciousness of our
organs, on numberless
occasions;
the crooked appearance of an oar in
water; the various aspects
of objects,
according to their different
distances; the double images
which
arise from the pressing one eye;
with many other appearances
of a
like nature. These sceptical
topics, indeed, are only
sufficient
to prove, that the senses alone
are not implicitly to be
depended
on; but that we must correct their
evidence by reason, and by
considerations,
derived from the nature
of the medium, the distance
of the
object, and the disposition of
the organ, in order to
render them,
within their sphere, the proper
criteria of truth and
falsehood.
There are other more profound
arguments against the
senses, which
admit not of so easy a solution.
118. It seems
evident, that
men are carried, by a natural instinct
or prepossession, to repose
faith
in their senses; and that, without
any reasoning, or even
almost before
the use of reason, we always
suppose an external
universe, which
depends not on our perception, but
would exist, though we and
every
sensible creature were absent or
annihilated. Even the animal
creation
are governed by a like
opinion, and preserve this
belief
of external objects, in all their
thoughts, designs, and
actions.
It seems also
evident, that,
when men follow this blind and powerful
instinct of nature, they
always
suppose the very images, presented
by the senses, to be the
external
objects, and never entertain any
suspicion, that the one are
nothing
but representations of the
other. This very table which
we
see white, and which we feel hard,
is believed to exist,
independent
of our perception, and to be
something external to our
mind,
which perceives it. Our presence
bestows not being on it: our
absence
does not annihilate it. It
preserves its existence
uniform
and entire, independent of the
situation of intelligent
beings,
who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal
and primary
opinion of all men is soon
destroyed by the slightest
philosophy,
which teaches us, that
nothing can ever be present
to the
mind but an image or perception,
and that the senses are only
the
inlets, through which these images
are conveyed, without being
able
to produce any immediate
intercourse between the mind
and
the object. The table, which we
see, seems to diminish, as
we remove
farther from it: but the real
table, which exists
independent
of us, suffers no alteration: it
was, therefore, nothing but
its
image, which was present to the
mind. These are the obvious
dictates
of reason; and no man, who
reflects, ever doubted, that
the
existences, which we consider, when
we say, this house and that
tree,
are nothing but perceptions in the
mind, and fleeting copies or
representations
of other existences,
which remain uniform and
independent.
119. So far, then,
are we
necessitated by reasoning to contradict or
depart from the primary
instincts
of nature, and to embrace a new
system with regard to the
evidence
of our senses. But here
philosophy finds herself
extremely
embarrassed, when she would justify
this new system, and obviate
the
cavils and objections of the
sceptics. She can no longer
plead
the infallible and irresistible
instinct of nature: for that
led
us to a quite different system, which
is acknowledged fallible and
even
erroneous. And to justify this
pretended philosophical
system,
by a chain of clear and convincing
argument, or even any
appearance
of argument, exceeds the power of all
human capacity.
By what argument
can it be
proved, that the perceptions of the
mind must be caused by
external
objects, entirely different from them,
though resembling them (if
that
be possible) and could not arise
either from the energy of
the mind
itself, or from the suggestion of
some invisible and unknown
spirit,
or from some other cause still more
unknown to us? It is
acknowledged,
that, in fact, many of these
perceptions arise not from
anything
external, as in dreams, madness,
and other diseases. And
nothing
can be more inexplicable than the
manner, in which body should
so
operate upon mind as ever to convey an
image of itself to a
substance,
supposed of so different, and even
contrary a nature.
It is a question
of fact,
whether the perceptions of the senses be
produced by external
objects, resembling
them: how shall this question
be determined? By experience
surely;
as all other questions of a
like nature. But here
experience
is, and must be entirely silent.
The mind has never anything
present
to it but the perceptions, and
cannot possibly reach any
experience
of their connexion with
objects. The supposition of
such
a connexion is, therefore, without
any foundation in reasoning.
120. To have
recourse to the
veracity of the Supreme Being, in order
to prove the veracity of our
senses,
is surely making a very
unexpected circuit. If his
veracity
were at all concerned in this
matter, our senses would be
entirely
infallible; because it is not
possible that he can ever
deceive.
Not to mention, that, if the
external world be once
called in
question, we shall be at a loss to
find arguments, by which we
may
prove the existence of that Being or
any of his attributes.
121. This is a
topic, therefore,
in which the profounder and more
philosophical sceptics will
always
triumph, when they endeavour to
introduce an universal doubt
into
all subjects of human knowledge
and enquiry. Do you follow
the instincts
and propensities of nature,
may they say, in assenting
to the
veracity of sense? But these lead
you to believe that the very
perception
or sensible image is the
external object. Do you
disclaim
this principle, in order to embrace a
more rational opinion, that
the
perceptions are only representations
of something external? You
here
depart from your natural
propensities and more
obvious sentiments;
and yet are not able to
satisfy your reason, which
can never
find any convincing argument from
experience to prove, that
the perceptions
are connected with any
external objects.
122. There is
another sceptical
topic of a like nature, derived from
the most profound
philosophy; which
might merit our attention, were it
requisite to dive so deep,
in order
to discover arguments and
reasonings, which can so
little
serve to any serious purpose. It is
universally allowed by
modern enquirers,
that all the sensible
qualities of objects, such
as hard,
soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c.
are merely secondary, and
exist
not in the objects themselves, but are
perceptions of the mind,
without
any external archetype or model,
which they represent. If
this be
allowed, with regard to secondary
qualities, it must also
follow,
with regard to the supposed primary
qualities of extension and
solidity;
nor can the latter be any more
entitled to that
denomination than
the former. The idea of extension
is entirely acquired from
the senses
of sight and feeling; and if
all the qualities, perceived
by
the senses, be in the mind, not in the
object, the same conclusion
must
reach the idea of extension which
is wholly dependent on the
sensible
ideas or the ideas of secondary
qualities. Nothing can save
us from
this conclusion, but the
asserting, that the ideas of
those
primary qualities are attained by
Abstraction, an opinion,
which,
if we examine it accurately, we
shall find to be
unintelligible,
and even absurd. An extension, that
is neither tangible nor
visible,
cannot possibly be conceived: and a
tangible or visible
extension, which
is neither hard nor soft, black
nor white, is equally beyond
the
reach of human conception. Let any
man try to conceive a
triangle in
general, which is neither
Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor
has
any particular length or proportion of
sides; and he will soon
perceive
the absurdity of all the scholastic
notions with regard to
abstraction
and general ideas.*
* This argument is
drawn from
Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the
writings of that very
ingenious
author form the best lessons of
scepticism which are to be
found
either among the ancient or modern
philosophers, Bayle not
excepted.
He professes, however, in his
title page (and undoubtedly
with
great truth) to have composed his
book against the sceptics as
well
as against the atheists and
free-thinkers. But that all
his
arguments, though otherwise
intended, are, in reality,
merely
sceptical, appears from this, that
they admit of no answer and
produce
no conviction. Their only effect
is to cause that momentary
amazement
and irresolution and confusion,
which is the result of
scepticism.
123. Thus the
first philosophical
objection to the evidence of sense
or to the opinion of
external existence
consists in this, that such an
opinion, if rested on
natural instinct,
is contrary to reason, and
if referred to reason, is
contrary
to natural instinct, and at the
same time carries no
rational evidence
with it, to convince an
impartial enquirer. The
second objection
goes farther, and
represents this opinion as
contrary
to reason: at least, if it be a
principle of reason, that
all sensible
qualities are in the mind,
not in the object. Bereave
matter
of all its intelligible qualities,
both primary and secondary,
you
in a manner annihilate it, and leave
only a certain unknown,
inexplicable
something, as the cause of our
perceptions; a notion so
imperfect,
that no sceptic will think it
worth while to contend
against it.
PART II.
124. It may seem a
very extravagant
attempt of the sceptics to
destroy reason by argument
and ratiocination;
yet is this the grand
scope of all their enquiries
and
disputes. They endeavour to find
objections, both to our
abstract
reasonings, and to those which regard
matter of fact and existence.
The chief
objection against
all abstract reasonings is derived
from the ideas of space and
time;
ideas, which, in common life and
to a careless view, are very
clear
and intelligible, but when they
pass through the scrutiny of
the
profound sciences (and they are the
chief object of these
sciences)
afford principles, which seem full
of absurdity and
contradiction.
No priestly dogmas, invented on
purpose to tame and subdue
the rebellious
reason of mankind, ever
shocked common sense more
than the
doctrine of the infinitive
divisibility of extension,
with
its consequences; as they are
pompously displayed by all
geometricians
and metaphysicians, with a
kind of triumph and
exultation.
A real quantity, infinitely less
than any finite quantity,
containing
quantities infinitely less than
itself, and so on in
infinitum;
this is an edifice so bold and
prodigious, that it is too
weighty
for any pretended demonstration
to support, because it
shocks the
clearest and most natural principles
of human reason.* But what
renders
the matter more extraordinary,
is, that these seemingly
absurd
opinions are supported by a chain of
reasoning, the clearest and
most
natural; nor is it possible for us to
allow the premises without
admitting
the consequences. Nothing can
be more convincing and
satisfactory
than all the conclusions
concerning the properties of
circles
and triangles; and yet, when
these are once received, how
can
we deny, that the angle of contact
between a circle and its
tangent
is infinitely less than any
rectilineal angle, that as
you may
increase the diameter of the circle
in infinitum, this angle of
contact
becomes still less, even in
infinitum, and that the
angle of
contact between other curves and
their tangents may be
infinitely
less than those between any circle
and its tangent, and so on,
in infinitum?
The demonstration of these
principles seems as
unexceptionable
as that which proves the three
angles of a triangle to be
equal
to two right ones, though the
latter opinion be natural
and easy,
and the former big with
contradiction and absurdity.
Reason
here seems to be thrown into a
kind of amazement and
suspence,
which, without the suggestions of
any sceptic, gives her a
diffidence
of herself, and of the ground on
which she treads. She sees a
full
light, which illuminates certain
places; but that light
borders upon
the most profound darkness. And
between these she is so
dazzled
and confounded, that she scarcely
can pronounce with certainty
and
assurance concerning any one object.
* Whatever
disputes there
may be about mathematical points, we
must allow that there are
physical
points; that is, parts of
extension, which cannot be
divided
or lessened, either by the eye or
imagination. These images,
then,
which are present to the fancy or
senses, are absolutely
indivisible,
and consequently must be allowed
by mathematicians to be
infinitely
less than any real part of
extension; and yet nothing
appears
more certain to reason, than that
an infinite number of them
composes
an infinite extension. How much
more an infinite number of
those
infinitely small parts of
extension, which are still
supposed
infinitely divisible.
125. The absurdity
of these
bold determinations of the abstract
sciences seems to become, if
possible,
still more palpable with regard
to time than extension. An
infinite
number of real parts of time,
passing in succession, and
exhausted
one after another, appears so
evident a contradiction,
that no
man, one should think, whose
judgement is not corrupted,
instead
of being improved, by the
sciences, would ever be able
to
admit of it.
Yet still reason
must remain
restless, and unquiet, even with regard
to that scepticism, to which
she
is driven by these seeming
absurdities and
contradictions.
How any clear, distinct idea can
contain circumstances,
contradictory
to itself, or to any other clear,
distinct idea, is absolutely
incomprehensible;
and is, perhaps, as
absurd as any proposition,
which
can be formed. So that nothing can be
more sceptical, or more full
of
doubt and hesitation, than this
scepticism itself, which
arises
from some of the paradoxical
conclusions of geometry or
the science
of quantity.*
* It seems to me
not impossible
to avoid these absurdities and
contradictions, if it be
admitted,
that there is no such thing as
abstract or general ideas,
properly
speaking; but that all general
ideas are, in reality,
particular
ones, attached to a general term,
which recalls, upon
occasion, other
particular ones, that resemble, in
certain circumstances, the
idea,
present to the mind. Thus when the
term Horse is pronounced, we
immediately
figure to ourselves the
idea of a black or a white
animal,
of a particular size or figure: But
as that term is also usually
applied
to animals of other colours,
figures and sizes, these
ideas,
though not actually present to the
imagination, are easily
recalled;
and our reasoning and conclusion
proceed in the same way, as
if they
were actually present. If this
be admitted (as seems
reasonable)
it follows that all the ideas of
quantity, upon which
mathematicians
reason, are nothing but
particular, and such as are
suggested
by the senses and imagination,
and consequently, cannot be
infinitely
divisible. It is sufficient
to have dropped this hint at
present,
without prosecuting it any
farther. It certainly
concerns all
lovers of science not to expose
themselves to the ridicule
and contempt
of the ignorant by their
conclusions; and this seems
the
readiest solution of these
difficulties.
126. The sceptical
objections
to moral evidence, or to the
reasonings concerning matter
of
fact, are either popular or
philosophical. The popular
objections
are derived from the natural
weakness of human
understanding;
the contradictory opinions, which
have been entertained in
different
ages and nations; the variations of
our judgement in sickness
and health,
youth and old age, prosperity
and adversity; the perpetual
contradiction
of each particular man's
opinions and sentiments;
with many
other topics of that kind. It is
needless to insist farther
on this
head. These objections are but
weak. For as, in common
life, we
reason every moment concerning fact
and existence, and cannot
possibly
subsist, without continually
employing this species of
argument,
any popular objections, derived
from thence, must be
insufficient
to destroy that evidence. The
great subverter of
Pyrrhonism or
the excessive principles of
scepticism is action, and
employment,
and the occupations of common
life. These principles may
flourish
and triumph in the schools;
where it is, indeed,
difficult,
if not impossible, to refute them. But
as soon as they leave the
shade,
and by the presence of the real
objects, which actuate our
passions
and sentiments, are put in
opposition to the more
powerful
principles of our nature, they
vanish like smoke, and leave
the
most determined sceptic in the same
condition as other mortals.
127. The sceptic,
therefore,
had better keep within his proper
sphere, and display those
philosophical
objections, which arise from
more profound researches.
Here he
seems to have ample matter of
triumph; while he justly
insists,
that all our evidence for any matter
of fact, which lies beyond
the testimony
of sense or memory, is
derived entirely from the
relation
of cause and effect; that we have
no other idea of this
relation than
that of two objects, which have
been frequently conjoined
together;
that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects,
which
have, in our experience, been
frequently conjoined, will
likewise,
in other instances, be
conjoined in the same
manner; and
that nothing leads us to this
inference but custom or a
certain
instinct of our nature; which it
is indeed difficult to
resist, but
which, like other instincts, may be
fallacious and deceitful.
While
the sceptic insists upon these topics,
he shows his force, or
rather, indeed,
his own and our weakness; and
seems, for the time at
least, to
destroy all assurance and conviction.
These arguments might be
displayed
at greater length, if any durable
good or benefit to society
could
ever be expected to result from them.
128. For here is
the chief
and most confounding objection to
excessive scepticism, that
no durable
good can ever result from it;
while it remains in its full
force
and vigour. We need only ask such a
sceptic, What his meaning
is? And
what he proposes by all these
curious researches? He is
immediately
at a loss, and knows not what to
answer. A Copernican or
Ptolemaic,
who supports each his different
system of astronomy, may
hope to
produce a conviction, which will
remain constant and durable,
with
his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean
displays principles, which
may not
be durable, but which have an
effect on conduct and
behaviour.
But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect,
that his philosophy will
have any
constant influence on the mind: or
if it had, that its
influence would
be beneficial to society. On the
contrary, he must
acknowledge, if
he will acknowledge anything, that
all human life must perish,
were
his principles universally and
steadily to prevail. All
discourse,
all action would immediately
cease; and men remain in a
total
lethargy, till the necessities of
nature, unsatisfied, put an
end
to their miserable existence. It is
true; so fatal an event is
very
little to be dreaded. Nature is always
too strong for principle.
And though
a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or
others into a momentary
amazement
and confusion by his profound
reasonings; the first and
most trivial
event in life will put to
flight all his doubts and
scruples,
and leave him the same, in every
point of action and
speculation,
with the philosophers of every
other sect, or with those
who never
concerned themselves in any
philosophical researches.
When he
awakes from his dream, he will be
the first to join in the
laugh against
himself, and to confess, that
all his objections are mere
amusement,
and can have no other
tendency than to show the
whimsical
condition of mankind, who must act
and reason and believe;
though they
are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy
themselves
concerning the foundation of
these operations, or to
remove the
objections, which may be raised
against them.
PART III.
129. There is,
indeed, a more
mitigated scepticism or academical
philosophy, which may be
both durable
and useful, and which may, in
part, be the result of this
Pyrrhonism,
or excessive scepticism,
when its undistinguished
doubts
are, in some measure, corrected by
common sense and reflection.
The
greater part of mankind are naturally
apt to be affirmative and
dogmatical
in their opinions; and while they
see objects only on one
side, and
have no idea of any counterpoising
argument, they throw
themselves
precipitately into the principles,
to which they are inclined;
nor
have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite
sentiments. To
hesitate or balance perplexes
their understanding, checks
their
passion, and suspends their
action. They are, therefore,
impatient
till they escape from a
state, which to them is so
uneasy:
and they think, that they could
never remove themselves far
enough
from it, by the violence of their
affirmations and obstinacy
of their
belief. But could such
dogmatical reasoners become
sensible
of the strange infirmities of
human understanding, even in
its
most perfect state, and when most
accurate and cautious in its
determinations;
such a reflection would
naturally inspire them with
more
modesty and reserve, and diminish
their fond opinion of
themselves,
and their prejudice against
antagonists. The illiterate
may
reflect on the disposition of the
learned, who, amidst all the
advantages
of study and reflection, are
commonly still diffident in
their
determinations: and if any of the
learned be inclined, from
their
natural temper, to haughtiness and
obstinacy, a small tincture
of Pyrrhonism
might abate their pride,
by showing them, that the
few advantages,
which they may have attained
over their fellows, are but
inconsiderable,
if compared with the
universal perplexity and
confusion,
which is inherent in human nature.
In general, there is a
degree of
doubt, and caution, and modesty,
which, in all kinds of
scrutiny
and decision, ought for ever to
accompany a just reasoner.
130. Another
species of mitigated
scepticism which may be of
advantage to mankind, and
which
may be the natural result of the
Pyrrhonian doubts and
scruples,
is the limitation of our enquiries
to such subjects as are best
adapted
to the narrow capacity of human
understanding. The
imagination of
man is naturally sublime,
delighted with whatever is
remote
and extraordinary, and running,
without control, into the
most distant
parts of space and time in
order to avoid the objects,
which
custom has rendered too familiar
to it. A correct Judgement
observes
a contrary method, and avoiding
all distant and high
enquiries,
confines itself to common life, and to
such subjects as fall under
daily
practice and experience; leaving the
more sublime topics to the
embellishment
of poets and orators, or to
the arts of priests and
politicians.
To bring us to so salutary a
determination, nothing can
be more
serviceable, than to be once
thoroughly convinced of the
force
of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of
the impossibility, that
anything,
but the strong power of natural
instinct, could free us from
it.
Those who have a propensity to
philosophy, will still
continue
their researches; because they
reflect, that, besides the
immediate
pleasure, attending such an
occupation, philosophical
decisions
are nothing but the reflections of
common life, methodized and
corrected.
But they will never be
tempted to go beyond common
life,
so long as they consider the
imperfection of those
faculties
which they employ, their narrow reach,
and their inaccurate
operations.
While we cannot give a satisfactory
reason, why we believe,
after a
thousand experiments, that a stone
will fall, or fire burn; can
we
ever satisfy ourselves concerning
any determination, which we
may
form, with regard to the origin of
worlds, and the situation of
nature,
from, and to eternity?
This narrow
limitation, indeed,
of our enquiries, is, in every
respect, so reasonable, that
it
suffices to make the slightest
examination into the natural
powers
of the human mind and to compare
them with their objects, in
order
to recommend it to us. We shall then
find what are the proper
subjects
of science and enquiry.
131. It seems to
me, that
the only objects of the abstract science
or of demonstration are
quantity
and number, and that all attempts
to extend this more perfect
species
of knowledge beyond these bounds
are mere sophistry and
illusion.
As the component parts of quantity
and number are entirely
similar,
their relations become intricate
and involved; and nothing
can be
more curious, as well as useful, than
to trace, by a variety of
mediums,
their equality or inequality,
through their different
appearances.
But as all other ideas are
clearly distinct and
different from
each other, we can never advance
farther, by our utmost
scrutiny,
than to observe this diversity,
and, by an obvious
reflection, pronounce
one thing not to be
another. Or if there be any
difficulty
in these decisions, it proceeds
entirely from the
undeterminate
meaning of words, which is corrected
by juster definitions. That
the
square of the hypothenuse is equal
to the squares of the other
two
sides, cannot be known, let the
terms be ever so exactly
defined,
without a train of reasoning and
enquiry. But to convince us
of this
proposition, that where there is
no property, there can be no
injustice,
it is only necessary to define
the terms, and explain
injustice
to be a violation of property. This
proposition is, indeed,
nothing
but a more imperfect definition. It is
the same case with all those
pretended
syllogistical reasonings, which
may be found in every other
branch
of learning, except the sciences of
quantity and number; and
these may
safely, I think, be pronounced
the only proper objects of
knowledge
and demonstration.
132. All other
enquiries of
men regard only matter of fact and
existence; and these are
evidently
incapable of demonstration.
Whatever is may not be. No
negation
of a fact can involve a
contradiction. The
non-existence
of any being, without exception, is
as clear and distinct an
idea as
its existence. The proposition, which
affirms it not to be,
however false,
is no less conceivable and
intelligible, than that
which affirms
it to be. The case is
different with the sciences,
properly
so called. Every proposition,
which is not true, is there
confused
and unintelligible. That the cube
root of 64 is equal to the
half
of 10, is a false proposition, and can
never be distinctly
conceived. But
that Caesar, or the angel
Gabriel, or any being never
existed,
may be a false proposition, but
still is perfectly
conceivable,
and implies no contradiction.
The existence,
therefore,
of any being can only be proved by
arguments from its cause or
its
effect; and these arguments are
founded entirely on
experience.
If we reason a priori, anything may
appear able to produce
anything.
The falling of a pebble may, for
aught we know, extinguish
the sun;
or the wish of a man control the
planets in their orbits. It
is only
experience, which teaches us the
nature and bounds of cause
and effect,
and enables us to infer the
existence of one object from
that
of another.* Such is the
foundation of moral
reasoning, which
forms the greater part of human
knowledge, and is the source
of
all human action and behaviour.
* That impious
maxim of the
ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihil
fit, by which the creation
of matter
was excluded, ceases to be a
maxim, according to this
philosophy.
Not only the will of the
supreme Being may create
matter;
but, for aught we know a priori,
the will of any other being
might
create it, or any other cause,
that the most whimsical
imagination
can assign.
Moral reasonings
are either
concerning particular or general
facts. All deliberations in
life
regard the former; as also all
disquisitions in history,
chronology,
geography, and astronomy.
The sciences,
which treat
of general facts, are politics, natural
philosophy, physic,
chemistry, &c.
where the qualities, causes and
effects of a whole species
of objects
are enquired into.
Divinity or
Theology, as it
proves the existence of a Deity, and the
immortality of souls, is
composed
partly of reasonings concerning
particular, partly
concerning general
facts. It has a foundation in
reason, so far as it is
supported
by experience. But its best and most
solid foundation is faith
and divine
revelation.
Morals and
criticism are not
so properly objects of the
understanding as of taste
and sentiment.
Beauty, whether moral or
natural, is felt, more
properly
than perceived. Or if we reason
concerning it, and endeavor
to fix
its standard, we regard a new fact,
to wit, the general tastes
of mankind,
or some such fact, which may be
the object of reasoning and
enquiry.
When we run over
libraries,
persuaded of these principles, what
havoc must we make? If we
take in
our hand any volume; of divinity
or school metaphysics, for
instance;
let us ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning
concerning quantity
or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental
reasoning
concerning matter of fact and
existence? No. Commit it
then to
the flames: for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and
illusion.
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