Sect.
XI. Of a
particular Providence and of a future State
102. I was lately
engaged
in conversation with a friend who loves
sceptical paradoxes; where,
though
he advanced many principles, of
which I can by no means
approve,
yet as they seem to be curious, and
to bear some relation to the
chain
of reasoning carried on
throughout this enquiry, I
shall
here copy them from my memory as
accurately as I can, in
order to
submit them to the judgement of the
reader.
Our conversation
began with
my admiring the singular good fortune of
philosophy, which, as it
requires
entire liberty above all other
privileges, and chiefly
flourishes
from the free opposition of
sentiments and
argumentation, received
its first birth in an age and
country of freedom and
toleration,
and was never cramped, even in
its most extravagant
principles,
by any creeds, concessions, or
penal statutes. For, except
the
banishment of Protagoras, and the
death of Socrates, which
last event
proceeded partly from other
motives, there are scarcely
any
instances to be met with, in ancient
history, of this bigotted
jealousy,
with which the present age is so
much infested. Epicurus
lived at
Athens to an advanced age, in peace
and tranquillity:
Epicureans* were
even admitted to receive the
sacerdotal character, and to
officiate
at the altar, in the most
sacred rites of the
established
religion: And the public
encouragement*(2) of
pensions and
salaries was afforded equally, by
the wisest of all the Roman
emperors,*(3)
to the professors of every
sect of philosophy. How
requisite
such kind of treatment was to
philosophy, in her early
youth,
will easily be conceived, if we
reflect, that, even at
present,
when she may be supposed more hardy
and robust, she bears with
much
difficulty the inclemency of the
seasons, and those harsh
winds of
calumny and persecution, which
blow upon her.
* Lucian, sump. e
Lapithai
[The Banquet, or the Lapiths].
*(2) Lucian,
eunouchos [The
Eunuch].
*(3) Lucian and
Dio.
You admire, says
my friend,
as the singular good fortune of
philosophy, what seems to
result
from the natural course of things,
and to be unavoidable in
every age
and nation. This pertinacious
bigotry, of which you
complain,
as so fatal to philosophy, is really
her offspring, who, after
allying
with superstition, separates himself
entirely from the interest
of his
parent, and becomes her most
inveterate enemy and
persecutor.
Speculative dogmas of religion, the
present occasions of such
furious
dispute, could not possibly be
conceived or admitted in the
early
ages of the world; when mankind,
being wholly illiterate,
formed
an idea of religion more suitable to
their weak apprehension, and
composed
their sacred tenets of such
tales chiefly as were the
objects
of traditional belief, more than
of argument or disputation.
After
the first alarm, therefore, was
over, which arose from the
new paradoxes
and principles of the
philosophers; these teachers
seem
ever after, during the ages of
antiquity, to have lived in
great
harmony with the established
superstition, and to have
made a
fair partition of mankind between
them; the former claiming
all the
learned and wise, the latter
possessing all the vulgar
and illiterate.
103. It seems
then, say I,
that you leave politics entirely out of
the question, and never
suppose,
that a wise magistrate can justly
be jealous of certain tenets
of
philosophy, such as those of Epicurus,
which, denying a divine
existence,
and consequently a providence and a
future state, seem to
loosen, in
a great measure, the ties of
morality, and may be
supposed, for
that reason, pernicious to the
peace of civil society.
I know, replied
he, that in
fact these persecutions never, in any
age, proceeded from calm
reason,
or from experience of the
pernicious consequences of
philosophy;
but arose entirely from passion
and prejudice. But what if I
should
advance farther, and assert,
that if Epicurus had been
accused
before the people, by any of the
sycophants or informers of
those
days, he could easily have defended
his cause, and proved his
principles
of philosophy to be as salutary
as those of his adversaries,
who
endeavoured, with such zeal, to
expose him to the public
hatred
and jealousy?
I wish, said I,
you would
try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a
topic, and make a speech for
Epicurus,
which might satisfy, not the
mob of Athens, if you will
allow
that ancient and polite city to
have contained any mob, but
the
more philosophical part of his
audience, such as might be
supposed
capable of comprehending his
arguments.
The matter would
not be difficult,
upon such conditions, replied he:
And if you please, I shall
suppose
myself Epicurus for a moment, and
make you stand for the
Athenian
people, and shall deliver you such
an harangue as will fill all
the
urn with white beans, and leave not a
black one to gratify the
malice
of my adversaries.
Very well: Pray
proceed upon
these suppositions.
104. I come
hither, O ye Athenians,
to justify in your assembly what
I maintained in my school,
and I
find myself impeached by furious
antagonists, instead of
reasoning
with calm and dispassionate
enquirers. Your
deliberations, which
of right should be directed to
questions of public good,
and the
interest of the commonwealth, are
diverted to the
disquisitions of
speculative philosophy; and these
magnificent, but perhaps
fruitless
enquiries, take place of your
more familiar but more
useful occupations.
But so far as in me lies, I
will prevent this abuse. We
shall
not here dispute concerning the
origin and government of
worlds.
We shall only enquire how far such
questions concern the public
interest.
And if I can persuade you, that
they are entirely
indifferent to
the peace of society and security
of government, I hope that
you will
presently send us back to our
schools, there to examine,
at leisure,
the question the most
sublime, but at the same
time, the
most speculative of all philosophy.
The religious
philosophers,
not satisfied with the tradition of your
forefathers, and doctrine of
your
priests (in which I willingly
acquiesce), indulge a rash
curiosity,
in trying how far they can
establish religion upon the
principles
of reason; and they thereby
excite, instead of
satisfying, the
doubts, which naturally arise
from a diligent and
scrutinous enquiry.
They paint, in the most
magnificent colours, the
order,
beauty, and wise arrangement of the
universe; and then ask, if
such
a glorious display of intelligence
could proceed from the
fortuitous
concourse of atoms, or if chance
could produce what the
greatest
genius can never sufficiently
admire. I shall not examine
the
justness of this argument. I shall
allow it to be as solid as
my antagonists
and accusers can desire.
It is sufficient, if I can
prove,
from this very reasoning, that the
question is entirely
speculative,
and that, when, in my
philosophical disquisitions,
I deny
a providence and a future state, I
undermine not the
foundations of
society, but advance principles,
which they themselves, upon
their
own topics, if they argue
consistently, must allow to
be solid
and satisfactory.
105. You then, who
are my
accusers, have acknowledged, that the
chief or sole argument for a
divine
existence (which I never
questioned) is derived from
the
order of nature; where there appear
such marks of intelligence
and design,
that you think it extravagant
to assign for its cause,
either
chance, or the blind and unguided
force of matter. You allow,
that
this is an argument drawn from
effects to causes. From the
order
of the work, you infer, that there
must have been project and
forethought
in the workman. If you cannot
make out this point, you
allow,
that your conclusion fails; and you
pretend not to establish the
conclusion
in a greater latitude than the
phenomena of nature will
justify.
These are your concessions. I desire
you to mark the consequences.
When we infer any
particular
cause from an effect, we must
proportion the one to the
other,
and can never be allowed to ascribe
to the cause any qualities,
but
what are exactly sufficient to produce
the effect. A body of ten
ounces
raised in any scale may serve as a
proof, that the
counterbalancing
weight exceeds ten ounces; but can
never afford a reason that
it exceeds
a hundred, If the cause,
assigned for any effect, be
not
sufficient to produce it, we must
either reject that cause, or
add
to it such qualities as will give
it a just proportion to the
effect.
But if we ascribe to it farther
qualities, or affirm it
capable
of producing other effects, we can
only indulge the licence of
conjecture,
and arbitrarily suppose the
existence of qualities and
energies,
without reason or authority.
The same rule
holds, whether
the cause assigned be brute unconscious
matter, or a rational
intelligent
being. If the cause be known only by
the effect, we never ought
to ascribe
to it any qualities, beyond what
are precisely requisite to
produce
the effect: Nor can we, by any
rules of just reasoning,
return
back from the cause, and infer other
effects from it, beyond
those by
which alone it is known to us. No
one, merely from the sight
of one
of Zeuxis's pictures, could know,
that he was also a statuary
or architect,
and was an artist no less
skilful in stone and marble
than
in colours. The talents and taste,
displayed in the particular
work
before us; these we may safely
conclude the workman to be
possessed
of. The cause must be
proportioned to the effect;
and
if we exactly and precisely proportion
it, we shall never find in
it any
qualities, that point farther, or
afford an inference
concerning any
other design or performance. Such
qualities must be somewhat
beyond
what is merely requisite for
producing the effect, which
we examine.
106. Allowing,
therefore,
the gods to be the authors of the
existence or order of the
universe;
it follows, that they possess that
precise degree of power,
intelligence,
and benevolence, which
appears in their
workmanship; but
nothing farther can ever be
proved, except we call in
the assistance
of exaggeration and
flattery to supply the
defects of
argument and reasoning. So far as
the traces of any
attributes, at
present, appear, so far may we
conclude these attributes to
exist.
The supposition of farther
attributes is mere
hypothesis; much
more the supposition, that, in
distant regions of space or
periods
of time, there has been, or will
be, a more magnificent
display of
these attributes, and a scheme of
administration more suitable
to
such imaginary virtues. We can never
be allowed to mount up from
the
universe, the effect, to Jupiter,
the cause; and then descend
downwards,
to infer any new effect from
that cause; as if the
present effects
alone were not entirely worthy
of the glorious attributes,
which
we ascribe to that deity. The
knowledge of the cause being
derived
solely from the effect, they must
be exactly adjusted to each
other;
and the one can never refer to
anything further, or be the
foundation
of any new inference and
conclusion.
You find certain
phenomena
in nature. You seek a cause or author.
You imagine that you have
found
him. You afterwards become so
enamoured of this offspring
of your
brain, that you imagine it
impossible, but he must
produce
something greater and more perfect
than the present scene of
things,
which is so full of ill and
disorder. You forget, that
this
superlative intelligence and
benevolence are entirely
imaginary,
or at least, without any
foundation in reason; and
that you
have no ground to ascribe to him
any qualities, but what you
see
he has actually exerted and
displayed in his
productions. Let
your gods, therefore, O
philosophers, be suited to
the present
appearances of nature: and
presume not to alter these
appearances
by arbitrary suppositions, in
order to suit them to the
attributes,
which you so fondly ascribe to
your deities.
107. When priests
and poets,
supported by your authority, O
Athenians, talk of a golden
or silver
age, which preceded the
present state of vice and
miscry,
I hear them with attention and
with reverence. But when
philosophers,
who pretend to neglect
authority, and to cultivate
reason,
hold the same discourse, I pay
them not, I own, the same
obsequious
submission and pious deference. I
ask; who carried them into
the celestial
regions, who admitted them
into the councils of the
gods, who
opened to them the book of fate,
that they thus rashly
affirm, that
their deities have executed, or
will execute, any purpose
beyond
what has actually appeared? If they
tell me, that they have
mounted
on the steps or by the gradual
ascent of reason, and by
drawing
inferences from effects to causes,
I still insist, that they
have aided
the ascent of reason by the wings
of imagination; otherwise
they could
not thus change their manner of
inference, and argue from
causes
to effects; presuming, that a more
perfect production than the
present
world would be more suitable to
such perfect beings as the
gods,
and forgetting that they have no
reason to ascribe to these
celestial
beings any perfection or any
attribute, but what can be
found
in the present world.
Hence all the
fruitless industry
to account for the ill
appearances of nature, and
save
the honour of the gods; while we
must acknowledge the reality
of
that evil and disorder, with which the
world so much abounds. The
obstinate
and intractable qualities of
matter, we are told, or the
observance
of general laws, or some such
reason, is the sole cause,
which
controlled the power and
benevolence of Jupiter, and
obliged
him to create mankind and every
sensible creature so
imperfect and
so unhappy. These attributes
then, are, it seems,
beforehand,
taken for granted, in their
greatest latitude. And upon
that
supposition, I own that such
conjectures may, perhaps, be
admitted
as plausible solutions of the
ill phenomena. But still I
ask;
Why take these attributes for granted,
or why ascribe to the cause
any
qualities but what actually appear
in the effect? Why torture
your
brain to justify the course of
nature upon suppositions,
which,
for aught you know, may be entirely
imaginary, and of which
there are
to be found no traces in the
course of nature?
The religious
hypothesis,
therefore, must be considered only as a
particular method of
accounting
for the visible phenomena of the
universe: but no just
reasoner will
ever presume to infer from it
any single fact, and alter
or add
to the phenomena, in any single
particular. If you think,
that the
appearances of things prove such
causes, it is allowable for
you
to draw an inference concerning the
existence of these causes.
In such
complicated and sublime subjects,
every one should be indulged
in
the liberty of conjecture and
argument. But here you ought
to
rest. If you come backward, and
arguing from your inferred
causes,
conclude, that any other fact has
existed, or will exist, in
the course
of nature, which may serve as
a fuller display of
particular attributes;
I must admonish you, that
you have departed from the
method
of reasoning, attached to the
present subject, and have
certainly
added something to the
attributes of the cause,
beyond
what appears in the effect;
otherwise you could never,
with
tolerable sense or propriety, add
anything to the effect, in
order
to render it more worthy of the
cause.
108. Where, then,
is the odiousness
of that doctrine, which I
teach in my school, or
rather, which
I examine in my gardens? Or
what do you find in this
whole question,
wherein the security of
good morals, or the peace
and order
of society, is in the least
concerned?
I deny a
providence, you say,
and supreme governor of the world, who
guides the course of events,
and
punishes the vicious with infamy
and disappointment, and
rewards
the virtuous with honour and
success, in all their
undertakings.
But surely, I deny not the
course itself of events,
which lies
open to every one's inquiry and
examination. I acknowledge,
that,
in the present order of things,
virtue is attended with more
peace
of mind than vice, and meets with a
more favourable reception
from the
world. I am sensible, that,
according to the past
experience
of mankind, friendship is the chief
joy of human life, and
moderation
the only source of tranquillity
and happiness. I never
balance between
the virtuous and the vicious
course of life; but am
sensible,
that, to a well-disposed mind,
every advantage is on the
side of
the former. And what can you say
more, allowing all your
suppositions
and reasonings? You tell me,
indeed, that this
disposition of
things proceeds from intelligence and
design. But whatever it
proceeds
from, the disposition itself, on
which depends our happiness
or misery,
and consequently our conduct
and deportment in life is
still
the same. It is still open for me,
as well as you, to regulate
my behaviour,
by my experience of past
events. And if you affirm,
that,
while a divine providence is allowed,
and a supreme distributive
justice
in the universe, I ought to
expect some more particular
reward
of the good, and punishment of
the bad, beyond the ordinary
course
of events; I here find the same
fallacy, which I have before
endeavoured
to detect. You persist in
imagining, that, if we grant
that
divine existence, for which you so
earnestly contend, you may
safely
infer consequences from it, and
add something to the
experienced
order of nature, by arguing from
the attributes which you
ascribe
to your gods. You seem not to
remember, that all your
reasonings
on this subject can only be drawn
from effects to causes; and
that
every argument, deducted from
causes to effects, must of
necessity
be a gross sophism; since it is
impossible for you to know
anything
of the cause, but what you have
antecedently, not inferred,
but
discovered to the full, in the effect.
109. But what must
a philosopher
think of those vain reasoners, who,
instead of regarding the
present
scene of things as the sole object of
their contemplation, so far
reverse
the whole course of nature, as
to render this life merely a
passage
to something farther; a porch,
which leads to a greater,
and vastly
different building; a prologue,
which serves only to
introduce the
piece, and give it more grace and
propriety? Whence, do you
think,
can such philosophers derive their
idea of the gods? From their
own
conceit and imagination surely. For
if they derived it from the
present
phenomena, it would never point to
anything farther, but must
be exactly
adjusted to them. That the
divinity may possibly be
endowed
with attributes, which we have
never seen exerted; may be
governed
by principles of action, which
we cannot discover to be
satisfied:
all this will freely be allowed.
But still this is mere
possibility
and hypothesis. We never can have
reason to in infer any
attributes,
or any principles of action in him,
but so far as we know them
to have
been exerted and satisfied.
Are there any
marks of a distributive
justice in the world? If you
answer in the affirmative, I
conclude,
that, since justice here exerts
itself, it is satisfied. If
you
reply in the negative, I conclude that
you have then no reason to
ascribe
justice, in our sense of it, to the
gods. If you hold a medium
between
affirmation and negation, by
saying, that the justice of
the
gods, at present, exerts itself in
part, but not in its full
extent;
I answer, that you have no reason to
give it any particular
extent, but
only so far as you see it, at
present, exert itself.
110. Thus I bring
the dispute,
O Athenians, to a short issue with my
antagonists. The course of
nature
lies open to my contemplation as
well as to theirs. The
experienced
train of events is the great
standard, by which we all
regulate
our conduct. Nothing else can be
appealed to in the field, or
in
the senate. Nothing else ought ever to
be heard of in the school,
or in
the closet. In vain would our limited
understanding break through
those
boundaries, which are too narrow for
our fond imagination. While
we argue
from the course of nature, and
infer a particular
intelligent cause,
which first bestowed, and
still preserves order in the
universe,
we embrace a principle, which
is both uncertain and
useless. It
is uncertain; because the subject
lies entirely beyond the
reach of
human experience. It is useless;
because our knowledge of
this cause
being derived entirely from the
course of nature, we can
never,
according to the rules of just
reasoning, return back from
the
cause with any new inference, or
making additions to the
common and
experienced course of nature,
establish any new principles
of
conduct and behaviour.
111. I observe
(said I, finding
he had finished his harangue) that
you neglect not the artifice
of
the demagogues of old; and as you were
pleased to make me stand for
the
people, you insinuate yourself into
my favour by embracing those
principles,
to which, you know, I have
always expressed a
particular attachment.
But allowing you to make
experience (as indeed I
think you
ought) the only standard of our
judgement concerning this,
and all
other questions of fact; I doubt
not but, from the very same
experience,
to which you appeal, it may be
possible to refute this
reasoning,
which you have put into the mouth
of Epicurus. If you saw, for
instance,
a half-finished building,
surrounded with heaps of
brick and
stone and mortar, and all the
instruments of masonry;
could you
not infer from the effect that it
was a work of design and
contrivance?
And could you not return
again, from this inferred
cause,
to infer new additions to the effect,
and conclude, that the
building
would soon be finished, and receive
all the further
improvements, which
art could bestow upon it? If you
saw upon the sea-shore the
print
of one human foot, you would
conclude, that a man had
passed
that way, and that he had also left
the traces of the other
foot, though
effaced by the rolling of the
sands or inundation of the
waters.
Why then do you refuse to admit the
same method of reasoning
with regard
to the order of nature?
Consider the world and the
present
life only as an imperfect building,
from which you can infer a
superior
intelligence; and arguing from
that superior intelligence,
which
can leave nothing imperfect; why may
you not infer a more
finished scheme
or plan, which will receive its
completion in some distant
point
of space or time? Are not these
methods of reasoning exactly
similar?
And under what pretence can
you embrace the one, while
you reject
the other?
112. The infinite
difference
of the subjects, replied he, is a
sufficient foundation for
this difference
in my conclusions. In
works of human art and
contrivance,
it is allowable to advance from
the effect to the cause, and
returning
back from the cause, to form
new inferences concerning
the effect,
and examine the alterations,
which it has probably
undergone,
or may still undergo. But what is the
foundation of this method of
reasoning?
Plainly this; that man is a
being, whom we know by
experience,
whose motives and designs we are
acquainted with, and whose
projects
and inclinations have a certain
connexion and coherence,
according
to the laws which nature has
established for the
government of
such a creature. When, therefore, we
find, that any work has
proceeded
from the skill and industry of
man; as we are otherwise
acquainted
with the nature of the animal,
we can draw a hundred
inferences
concerning what may be expected
from him; and these
inferences will
all be founded in experience and
observation. But did we know
man
only from the single work or
production which we examine,
it
were impossible for us to argue in
this manner; because our
knowledge
of all the qualities, which we
ascribe to him, being in
that case
derived from the production, it
is impossible they could
point to
anything farther, or be the
foundation of any new
inference.
The print of a foot in the sand can
only prove, when considered
alone,
that there was some figure
adapted to it, by which it
was produced:
but the print of a human foot
proves likewise, from our
other
experience, that there was probably
another foot, which also
left its
impression, though effaced by time
or other accidents. Here we
mount
from the effect to the cause; and
descending again from the
cause,
infer alterations in the effect;
but this is not a
continuation of
the same simple chain of
reasoning. We comprehend in
this
case a hundred other experiences
and observations, concerning
the
usual figure and members of that
species of animal, without
which
this method of argument must be
considered as fallacious and
sophistical.
113. The case is
not the same
with our reasonings from the works
of nature. The Deity is
known to
us only by his productions, and is
a single being in the
universe,
not comprehended under any species
or genus, from whose
experienced
attributes or qualities, we can, by
analogy, infer any attribute
or
quality in him. As the universe
shews wisdom and goodness,
we infer
wisdom and goodness. As it shews a
particular degree of these
perfections,
we infer a particular degree
of them, precisely adapted
to the
effect which we examine. But farther
attributes or farther
degrees of
the same attributes, we can never
be authorised to infer or
suppose,
by any rules of just reasoning.
Now, without some such
licence of
supposition, it is impossible for us
to argue from the cause, or
infer
any alteration in the effect, beyond
what has immediately fallen
under
our observation. Greater good
produced by this Being must
still
prove a greater degree of
goodness: a more impartial
distribution
of rewards and punishments
must proceed from a greater
regard
to justice and equity. Every
supposed addition to the
works of
nature makes an addition to the
attributes of the Author of
nature;
and consequently, being entirely
unsupported by any reason or
argument,
can never be admitted but as
mere conjecture and
hypothesis.*
* In general, it
may, I think,
be established as a maxim, that where
any cause is known only by
its particular
effects, it must be
impossible to infer any new
effects
from that cause; since the
qualities, which are
requisite to
produce these new effects along with
the former, must either be
different,
or superior, or of more
extensive operation, than
those
which simply produced the effect,
whence alone the cause is
supposed
to be known to us. We can never,
therefore, have any reason
to suppose
the existence of these
qualities. To say, that the
new
effects proceed only from a
continuation of the same
energy,
which is already known from the first
effects, will not remove the
difficulty.
For even granting this to
be the case (which can
seldom be
supposed), the very continuation
and exertion of a like
energy (for
it is impossible it can be
absolutely the same), I say,
this
exertion of a like energy, in a
different period of space
and time,
is a very arbitrary supposition,
and what there cannot
possibly be
any traces of in the effects, from
which all our knowledge of
the cause
is originally derived. Let the
inferred cause be exactly
proportioned
(as it should be) to the
known effect; and it is
impossible
that it can possess any
qualities, from which new or
different
effects can be inferred.
The great source
of our mistake
in this subject, and of the
unbounded licence of
conjecture,
which we indulge, is, that we tacitly
consider ourselves, as in
the place
of the Supreme Being, and
conclude, that he will, on
every
occasion, observe the same conduct,
which we ourselves, in his
situation,
would have embraced as
reasonable and eligible.
But, besides
that the ordinary course of
nature may convince us, that
almost
everything is regulated by
principles and maxims very
different
from ours; besides this, I say,
it must evidently appear
contrary
to all rules of analogy to reason,
from the intentions and
projects
of men, to those of a Being so
different, and so much
superior.
In human nature, there is a certain
experienced coherence of
designs
and inclinations; so that when,
from any fact, we have
discovered
one intention of any man, it may
often be reasonable, from
experience,
to infer another, and draw a
long chain of conclusions
concerning
his past or future conduct. But
this method of reasoning can
never
have place with regard to a
Being, so remote and
incomprehensible,
who bears much less analogy
to any other being in the
universe
than the sun to a waxen taper,
and who discovers himself
only by
some faint traces or outlines,
beyond which we have no
authority
to ascribe to him any attribute or
perfection. What we imagine
to be
a superior perfection, may really be
a defect. Or were it ever so
much
a perfection, the ascribing of it to
the Supreme Being, where it
appears
not to have been really exerted,
to the full, in his works,
savours
more of flattery and panegyric,
than of just reasoning and
sound
philosophy. All the philosophy,
therefore, in the world, and
all
the religion, which is nothing but
a species of philosophy,
will never
be able to carry us beyond the
usual course of experience,
or give
us measures of conduct and
behaviour different from
those which
are furnished by reflections on
common life. No new fact can
ever
be inferred from the religious
hypothesis; no event
foreseen or
foretold; no reward or punishment
expected or dreaded, beyond
what
is already known by practice and
observation. So that my
apology
for Epicurus will still appear solid
and satisfactory; nor have
the political
interests of society any
connexion with the
philosophical
disputes concerning metaphysics and
religion.
114. There is
still one circumstance,
replied I, which you seem to
have overlooked. Though I
should
allow your premises, I must deny your
conclusion. You conclude,
that religious
doctrines and reasonings
can have no influence on
life, because
they ought to have no
influence; never
considering, that
men reason not in the same manner
you do, but draw many
consequences
from the belief of a divine
Existence, and suppose that
the
Deity will inflict punishments on
vice, and bestow rewards on
virtue,
beyond what appear in the ordinary
course of nature. Whether
this reasoning
of theirs be just or not,
is no matter. Its influence
on their
life and conduct must still be
the same. And, those, who
attempt
to disabuse them of such prejudices,
may, for aught I know, be
good reasoners,
but I cannot allow them to
be good citizens and
politicians;
since they free men from one
restraint upon their
passions, and
make the infringement of the laws
of society, in one respect,
more
easy and secure.
After all, I may,
perhaps,
agree to your general conclusion in
favour of liberty, though
upon different
premises from those, on which
you endeavour to found it. I
think,
that the state ought to tolerate
every principle of
philosophy; nor
is there an instance, that any
government has suffered in
its political
interests by such indulgence.
There is no enthusiasm among
philosophers;
their doctrines are not
very alluring to the people;
and
no restraint can be put upon their
reasonings, but what must be
of
dangerous consequence to the sciences,
and even to the state, by
paving
the way for persecution and
oppression in points, where
the
generality of mankind are more
deeply interested and
concerned.
115. But there
occurs to me
(continued I) with regard to your main
topic, a difficulty, which I
shall
just propose to you without
insisting on it; lest it
lead into
reasonings of too nice and delicate
a nature. In a word, I much
doubt
whether it be possible for a cause
to be known only by its
effect (as
you have all along supposed) or
to be of so singular and
particular
a nature as to have no parallel
and no similarity with any
other
cause or object, that has ever fallen
under our observation. It is
only
when two species of objects are
found to be constantly
conjoined,
that we can infer the one from the
other; and were an effect
presented,
which was entirely singular,
and could not be
comprehended under
any known species, I do not see
that we could form any
conjecture
or inference at all concerning its
cause. If experience and
observation
and analogy be, indeed, the
only guides which we can
reasonably
follow in inferences of this
nature; both the effect and
cause
must bear a similarity and
resemblance to other effects
and
causes, which we know, and which we
have found, in many
instances, to
be conjoined with each other. I
leave it to your own
reflection
to pursue the consequences of this
principle. I shall just
observe,
that, as the antagonists of
Epicurus always suppose the
universe,
an effect quite singular and
unparalleled, to be the
proof of
a Deity, a cause no less singular and
unparalleled; your
reasonings, upon
that supposition, seem, at
least, to merit our
attention. There
is, I own, some difficulty, how
we can ever return from the
cause
to the effect, and, reasoning from
our ideas of the former,
infer any
alteration on the latter, or any
addition to it.
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