Sect.
X. Of Miracles
PART I.
86. There is, in
Dr. Tillotson's
writings, an argument against the
real presence, which is as
concise,
and elegant, and strong as any
argument can possibly be
supposed
against a doctrine, so little worthy
of a serious refutation. It
is acknowledged
on all hands, says that
learned prelate, that the
authority,
either of the scripture or of
tradition, is founded merely
in
the testimony of the apostles, who
were eye-witnesses to those
miracles
of our Saviour, by which he
proved his divine mission.
Our evidence,
then, for the truth of the
Christian religion is less
than
the evidence for the truth of our
senses; because, even in the
first
authors of our religion, it was
no greater; and it is
evident it
must diminish in passing from them to
their disciples; nor can any
one
rest such confidence in their
testimony, as in the
immediate object
of his senses. But a weaker
evidence can never destroy a
stronger;
and therefore, were the
doctrine of the real
presence ever
so clearly revealed in scripture,
it were directly contrary to
the
rules of just reasoning to give our
assent to it. It contradicts
sense,
though both the scripture and
tradition, on which it is
supposed
to be built, carry not such
evidence with them as sense;
when
they are considered merely as
external evidences, and are
not
brought home to every one's breast, by
the immediate operation of
the Holy
Spirit.
Nothing is so
convenient as
a decisive argument of this kind,
which must at least silence
the
most arrogant bigotry and
superstition, and free us
from their
impertinent solicitations. I
flatter myself, that I have
discovered
an argument of a like nature,
which, if just, will, with
the wise
and learned, be an everlasting
check to all kinds of
superstitious
delusion, and consequently, will
be useful as long as the
world endures.
For so long, I presume, will
the accounts of miracles and
prodigies
be found in all history, sacred
and profane.
87. Though
experience be our
only guide in reasoning concerning
matters of fact; it must be
acknowledged,
that this guide is not
altogether infallible, but
in some
cases is apt to lead us into
errors. One, who in our
climate,
should expect better weather in any
week of June than in one of
December,
would reason justly, and
conformably to experience;
but it
is certain, that he may happen, in
the event, to find himself
mistaken.
However, we may observe, that, in
such a case, he would have
no cause
to complain of experience; because
it commonly informs us
beforehand
of the uncertainty, by that
contrariety of events, which
we
may learn from a diligent observation.
All effects follow not with
like
certainty from their supposed causes.
Some events are found, in
all countries
and all ages, to have been
constantly conjoined
together: Others
are found to have been more
variable, and sometimes to
disappoint
our expectations; so that, in
our reasonings concerning
matter
of fact, there are all imaginable
degrees of assurance, from
the highest
certainty to the lowest species
of moral evidence.
A wise man,
therefore, proportions
his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are
founded
on an infallible experience, he
expects the event with the
last
degree of assurance, and regards his
past experience as a full
proof
of the future existence of that event.
In other cases, he proceeds
with
more caution: He weighs the
opposite experiments: He
considers
which side is supported by the
greater number of
experiments: to
that side he inclines, with doubt
and hesitation; and when at
last
he fixes his judgement, the
evidence exceeds not what we
properly
call probability. All
probability, then, supposes
an opposition
of experiments and
observations, where the one
side
is found to overbalance the other,
and to produce a degree of
evidence,
proportioned to the
superiority. A hundred
instances
or experiments on one side, and fifty
on another, afford a
doubtful expectation
of any event; though a
hundred uniform experiments,
with
only one that is contradictory,
reasonably beget a pretty
strong
degree of assurance. In all cases, we
must balance the opposite
experiments,
where they are opposite, and
deduct the smaller number
from the
greater, in order to know the exact
force of the superior
evidence.
88. To apply these
principles
to a particular instance; we may
observe that there is no
species
of reasoning more common, more
useful, and even necessary
to human
life, than that which is derived
from the testimony of men,
and the
reports of eye-witnesses and
spectators. This species of
reasoning,
perhaps, one may deny to be
founded on the relation of
cause
and effect. I shall not dispute about
a word. It will be
sufficient to
observe that our assurance in any
argument of this kind is
derived
from no other principle than our
observation of the veracity
of human
testimony, and of the usual
conformity of facts to the
reports
of witnesses. It being a general
maxim, that no objects have
any
discoverable connexion together, and
that all the inferences,
which we
can draw from one to another, are
founded merely on our
experience
of their constant and regular
conjunction; it is evident
that
we ought not to make an exception to
this maxim in favour of
human testimony,
whose connexion with any
event seems, in itself, as
little
necessary as any other. Were not the
memory tenacious to a
certain degree;
had not men commonly an
inclination to truth and a
principle
of probity; were they not
sensible to shame, when
detected
in a falsehood: Were not these, I
say, discovered by
experience to
be qualities, inherent in human
nature, we should never
repose the
least confidence in human
testimony. A man delirious,
or noted
for falsehood and villany, has no
manner of authority with us.
And as the
evidence, derived
from witnesses and human testimony,
is founded on past
experience, so
it varies with the experience, and
is regarded either as a
proof or
a probability, according as the
conjunction between any
particular
kind of report and any kind of
object has been found to be
constant
or variable. There are a number
of circumstances to be taken
into
consideration in all judgements of
this kind; and the ultimate
standard,
by which we determine all
disputes, that may arise
concerning
them, is always derived from
experience and observation.
Where
this experience is not entirely
uniform on any side, it is
attended
with an unavoidable contrariety in
our judgements, and with the
same
opposition and mutual destruction of
argument as in every other
kind
of evidence. We frequently hesitate
concerning the reports of
others.
We balance the opposite
circumstances, which cause
any doubt
or uncertainty; and when we
discover a superiority on
any side,
we incline to it; but still with a
diminution of assurance, in
proportion
to the force of its antagonist.
89. This
contrariety of evidence,
in the present case, may be
derived from several
different causes;
from the opposition of contrary
testimony; from the
character or
number of the witnesses; from the
manner of their delivering
their
testimony; or from the union of all
these circumstances. We
entertain
a suspicion concerning any matter of
fact, when the witnesses
contradict
each other; when they are but few,
or of a doubtful character;
when
they have an interest in what they
affirm; when they deliver
their
testimony with hesitation, or on the
contrary, with too violent
asseverations.
There are many other
particulars of the same
kind, which
may diminish or destroy the
force of any argument,
derived from
human testimony.
Suppose, for
instance, that
the fact, which the testimony endeavours
to establish, partakes of
the extraordinary
and the marvellous; in
that case, the evidence,
resulting
from the testimony, admits of a
diminution, greater or less,
in
proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason why we
place
any credit in witnesses and
historians, is not derived
from
any connexion, which we perceive a
priori, between testimony
and reality,
but because we are accustomed
to find a conformity between
them.
But when the fact attested is
such a one as has seldom
fallen
under our observation, here is a
contest of two opposite
experiences;
of which the one destroys the
other, as far as its force
goes,
and the superior can only operate
on the mind by the force,
which
remains. The very same principle of
experience, which gives us a
certain
degree of assurance in the
testimony of witnesses,
gives us
also, in this case, another degree of
assurance against the fact,
which
they endeavour to establish; from
which contradiction there
necessarily
arises a counterpoize, and
mutual destruction of belief
and
authority.
I should not
believe such
a story were it told me by Cato, was a
proverbial saying in Rome,
even
during the lifetime of that
philosophical patriot.* The
incredibility
of a fact, it was allowed,
might invalidate so great an
authority.
* Plutarch, Marcus
Cato.
The Indian prince,
who refused
to believe the first relations
concerning the effects of
frost,
reasoned justly; and it naturally
required very strong
testimony to
engage his assent to facts, that
arose from a state of
nature, with
which he was unacquainted, and
which bore so little analogy
to
those events, of which he had had
constant and uniform
experience.
Though they were not contrary to
his experience, they were
not conformable
to it.*
* No Indian, it is
evident,
could have experience that water did not
freeze in cold climates.
This is
placing nature in a situation quite
unknown to him; and it is
impossible
for him to tell a priori what
will result from it. It is
making
a new experiment, the consequence of
which is always uncertain.
One may
sometimes conjecture from analogy
what will follow; but still
this
is but conjecture. And it must be
confessed, that, in the
present
case of freezing, the event follows
contrary to the rules of
analogy,
and is such as a rational Indian
would not look for. The
operations
of cold upon water are not gradual,
according to the degrees of
cold;
but whenever it comes to the
freezing point, the water
passes
in a moment, from the utmost
liquidity to perfect
hardness. Such
an event, therefore, may be
denominated extraordinary,
and requires
a pretty strong testimony to
render it credible to people
in
a war climate: But still it is not
miraculous, nor contrary to
uniform
experience of the course of nature
in cases where all the
circumstances
are the same. The inhabitants
of Sumatra have always seen
water
fluid in their own climate, and
the freezing of their rivers
ought
to be deemed a prodigy: But they
never saw water in Muscovy
during
the winter; and therefore they
cannot reasonably be
positive what
would there be the consequence.
90. But in order
to encrease
the probability against the testimony
of witnesses, let us
suppose, that
the fact, which they affirm,
instead of being only
marvellous,
is really miraculous; and suppose
also, that the testimony
considered
apart and in itself, amounts to an
entire proof; in that case,
there
is proof against proof, of which the
strongest must prevail, but
still
with a diminution of its force, in
proportion to that of its
antagonist.
A miracle is a
violation of
the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has
established
these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very
nature of
the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can
possibly
be imagined. Why is it more than
probable, that all men must
die;
that lead cannot, of itself, remain
suspended in the air; that
fire
consumes wood, and is extinguished
by water; unless it be, that
these
events are found agreeable to the
laws of nature, and there is
required
a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to
prevent
them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle,
if it ever happen in the
common
course of nature. It is no miracle
that a man, seemingly in
good health,
should die on a sudden:
because such a kind of
death, though
more unusual than any other,
has yet been frequently
observed
to happen. But it is a miracle,
that a dead man should come
to life;
because that has never been
observed in any age or
country.
There must, therefore, be a uniform
experience against every
miraculous
event, otherwise the event would
not merit that appellation.
And
as a uniform experience amounts to a
proof, there is here a
direct and
full proof, from the nature of the
fact, against the existence
of any
miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle
rendered
credible, but by an opposite proof,
which is superior.*
* Sometimes an
event may not,
in itself, seem to be contrary to
the laws of nature, and yet,
if
it were real, it might, by reason of
some circumstances, be
denominated
a miracle; because, in fact, it
is contrary to these laws.
Thus
if a person, claiming a divine
authority, should command a
sick
person to be well, a healthful man to
fall down dead, the clouds
to pour
rain, the winds to blow, in
short, should order many
natural
events, which immediately follow upon
his command; these might
justly
be esteemed miracles, because they are
really, in this case,
contrary to
the laws of nature. For if any
suspicion remain, that the
event
and command concurred by accident,
there is no miracle and no
transgression
of the laws of nature. If
this suspicion be removed,
there
is evidently a miracle, and a
transgression of these laws;
because
nothing can be more contrary to
nature than that the voice
or command
of a man should have such an
influence. A miracle may be
accurately
defined, a transgression of a
law of nature by a
particular volition
of the Deity, or by the
interposition of some
invisible
agent. A miracle may either be
discoverable by men or not.
This
alters not its nature and essence.
The raising of a house or
ship into
the air is a visible miracle.
The raising of a feather,
when the
wind wants ever so little of a
force requisite for that
purpose,
is as real a miracle, though not
so sensible with regard to
us.
91. The plain
consequence
is (and it is a general maxim worthy of
our attention), "That no
testimony
is sufficient to establish a
miracle, unless the
testimony be
of such a kind, that its falsehood
would be more miraculous,
than the
fact, which it endeavours to
establish; and even in that
case
there is a mutual destruction of
arguments, and the superior
only
gives us an assurance suitable to
that degree of force, which
remains,
after deducting the inferior."
When anyone tells me, that
he saw
a dead man restored to life, I
immediately consider with
myself,
whether it be more probable, that
this person should either
deceive
or be deceived, or that the fact,
which he relates, should
really
have happened. I weigh the one miracle
against the other; and
according
to the superiority, which I discover,
I pronounce my decision, and
always
reject the greater miracle. If the
falsehood of his testimony
would
be more miraculous, than the event
which he relates; then, and
not
till then, can he pretend to command
my belief or opinion.
PART II.
92. In the
foregoing reasoning
we have supposed that the
testimony, upon which a
miracle
is founded, may possibly amount to
an entire proof, and that
the falsehood
of that testimony would be a
real prodigy: But it is easy
to
shew that we have been a great deal
too liberal in our
concession, and
that there never was a miraculous
event established on so full
an
evidence.
For first, there
is not to
be found, in all history, any miracle
attested by a sufficient
number
of men, of such unquestioned
good-sense, education, and
learning,
as to secure us against all
delusion in themselves; of
such
undoubted integrity, as to place
them beyond all suspicion of
any
design to deceive others; of such
credit and reputation in the
eyes
of mankind, as to have a great
deal to lose in case of
their being
detected in any falsehood; and
at the same time, attesting
facts
performed in such a public manner
and in so celebrated a part
of the
world, as to render the detection
unavoidable: All which
circumstances
are requisite to give us a full
assurance in the testimony
of men.
93. Secondly. We
may observe
in human nature a principle which, if
strictly examined, will be
found
to diminish extremely the
assurance, which we might,
from
human testimony, have, in any kind
of prodigy. The maxim, by
which
we commonly conduct ourselves in our
reasonings, is, that the
objects,
of which we have no experience,
resemble those, of which we
have;
that what we have found to be most
usual is always most
probable; and
that where there is an opposition
of arguments, we ought to
give the
preference to such as are founded
on the greatest number of
past observations.
But though, in proceeding
by this rule, we readily
reject
any fact which is unusual and
incredible in an ordinary
degree;
yet in advancing farther, the mind
observes not always the same
rule;
but when anything is affirmed
utterly absurd and
miraculous, it
rather the more readily admits of
such a fact, upon account of
that
very circumstance, which ought to
destroy all its authority.
The passion
of surprise and wonder, arising
from miracles, being an
agreeable
emotion, gives a sensible tendency
towards the belief of those
events,
from which it is derived. And this
goes so far, that even those
who
cannot enjoy this pleasure
immediately, nor can believe
those
miraculous events, of which they
are informed, yet love to
partake
of the satisfaction at second-hand
or by rebound, and place a
pride
and delight in exciting the
admiration of others.
With what
greediness are the
miraculous accounts of travellers
received, their descriptions
of
sea and land monsters, their relations
of wonderful adventures,
strange
men, and uncouth manners? But if
the spirit of religion join
itself
to the love of wonder, there is
an end of common sense; and
human
testimony, in these circumstances,
loses all pretensions to
authority.
A religionist may be an
enthusiast, and imagine he
sees
what has no reality: he may know his
narrative to be false, and
yet persevere
in it, with the best
intentions in the world, for
the
sake of promoting so holy a cause: or
even where this delusion has
not
place, vanity, excited by so strong a
temptation, operates on him
more
powerfully than on the rest of
mankind in any other
circumstances;
and self-interest with equal
force. His auditors may not
have,
and commonly have not, sufficient
judgement to canvass his
evidence:
what judgement they have, they
renounce by principle, in
these
sublime and mysterious subjects: or if
they were ever so willing to
employ
it, passion and a heated
imagination disturb the
regularity
of its operations. Their
credulity increases his
impudence:
and his impudence overpowers
their credulity.
Eloquence, when at
its highest
pitch, leaves little room for
reason or reflection; but
addressing
itself entirely to the fancy or
the affections, captivates
the willing
hearers, and subdues their
understanding. Happily, this
pitch
it seldom attains. But what a Tully
or a Demosthenes could
scarcely
effect over a Roman or Athenian
audience, every Capuchin,
every
itinerant or stationary teacher can
perform over the generality
of mankind,
and in a higher degree, by
touching such gross and
vulgar passions.
The many instances
of forged
miracles, and prophecies, and
supernatural events, which,
in all
ages, have either been detected
by contrary evidence, or
which detect
themselves by their absurdity,
prove sufficiently the
strong propensity
of mankind to the
extraordinary and the
marvellous,
and ought reasonably to beget a
suspicion against all
relations
of this kind. This is our natural
way of thinking, even with
regard
to the most common and most credible
events. For instance: There
is no
kind of report which rises so
easily, and spreads so
quickly,
especially in country places and
provincial towns, as those
concerning
marriages; insomuch that two
young persons of equal
condition
never see each other twice, but the
whole neighbourhood
immediately
join them together. The pleasure of
telling a piece of news so
interesting,
of propagating it, and of
being the first reporters of
it,
spreads the intelligence. And this is
so well known, that no man
of sense
gives attention to these
reports, till he find them
confirmed
by some greater evidence. Do
not the same passions, and
others
still stronger, incline the
generality of mankind to
believe
and report, with the greatest
vehemence and assurance, all
religious
miracles?
94. Thirdly. It
forms a strong
presumption against all
supernatural and miraculous
relations,
that they are observed
chiefly to abound among
ignorant
and barbarous nations; or if a
civilized people has ever
given
admission to any of them, that
people will be found to have
received
them from ignorant and barbarous
ancestors, who transmitted
them
with that inviolable sanction and
authority, which always
attend received
opinions. When we peruse the
first histories of all
nations,
we are apt to imagine ourselves
transported into some new
world;
where the whole frame of nature is
disjointed, and every
element performs
its operations in a different
manner, from what it does at
present.
Battles, revolutions,
pestilence, famine and
death, are
never the effect of those natural
causes, which we experience.
Prodigies,
omens, oracles, judgements,
quite obscure the few
natural events,
that are intermingled with them.
But as the former grow
thinner every
page, in proportion as we advance
nearer the enlightened ages,
we
soon learn, that there is nothing
mysterious or supernatural
in the
case, but that all proceeds from the
usual propensity of mankind
towards
the marvellous, and that, though
this inclination may at
intervals
receive a check from sense and
learning, it can never be
thoroughly
extirpated from human nature.
It is strange, a
judicious
reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of
these wonderful historians,
that
such prodigious events never happen
in our days. But it is
nothing strange,
I hope, that men should lie in
all ages. You must surely
have seen
instances enough of that
frailty. You have yourself
heard
many such marvellous relations
started, which, being
treated with
scorn by all the wise and
judicious, have at last been
abandoned
even by the vulgar. Be assured,
that those renowned lies,
which
have spread and flourished to such a
monstrous height, arose from
like
beginnings; but being sown in a more
proper soil, shot up at last
into
prodigies almost equal to those
which they relate.
It was a wise
policy in that
false prophet, Alexander, who though
now forgotten, was once so
famous,
to lay the first scene of his
impostures in Paphlagonia,
where,
as Lucian tells us, the people
were extremely ignorant and
stupid,
and ready to swallow even the
grossest delusion. People at
a distance,
who are weak enough to
think the matter at all
worth enquiry,
have no opportunity of
receiving better
information. The
stories come magnified to them by
a hundred circumstances.
Fools are
industrious in propagating the
imposture; while the wise
and learned
are contented, in general, to
deride its absurdity,
without informing
themselves of the particular
facts, by which it may be
distinctly
refuted. And thus the impostor
above mentioned was enabled
to proceed,
from his ignorant
Paphlagonians, to the
enlisting
of votaries, even among the Grecian
philosophers, and men of the
most
eminent rank and distinction in
Rome: nay, could engage the
attention
of that sage emperor Marcus
Aurelius; so far as to make
him
trust the success of a military
expedition to his delusive
prophecies.
The advantages are
so great,
of starting an imposture among an
ignorant people, that, even
though
the delusion should be too gross to
impose on the generality of
them
(which, though seldom, is sometimes
the case) it has a much
better chance
for succeeding in remote
countries, than if the first
scene
had been laid in a city renowned
for arts and knowledge. The
most
ignorant and barbarous of these
barbarians carry the report
abroad.
None of their countrymen have a
large correspondence, or
sufficient
credit and authority to contradict
and beat down the delusion.
Men's
inclination to the marvellous has
full opportunity to display
itself.
And thus a story, which is
universally exploded in the
place
where it was first started, shall
pass for certain at a
thousand miles
distance. But had Alexander fixed
his residence at Athens, the
philosophers
of that renowned mart of
learning had immediately
spread,
throughout the whole Roman empire,
their sense of the matter;
which,
being supported by so great
authority, and displayed by
all
the force of reason and eloquence, had
entirely opened the eyes of
mankind.
It is true; Lucian, passing by
chance through Paphlagonia,
had
an opportunity of performing this good
office. But, though much to
be wished,
it does not always happen, that
every Alexander meets with a
Lucian,
ready to expose and detect his
impostures.
95. I may add as a
fourth
reason, which diminishes the authority
of prodigies, that there is
no testimony
for any, even those which
have not been expressly
detected,
that is not opposed by an infinite
number of witnesses; so that
not
only the miracle destroys the
credit of testimony, but the
testimony
destroys itself. To make this
the better understood, let
us consider,
that, in matters of
religion, whatever is
different
is contrary; and that it is impossible
the religions of ancient
Rome, of
Turkey, of Siam, and of China
should, all of them, be
established
on any solid foundation. Every
miracle, therefore,
pretended to
have been wrought in any of these
religions (and all of them
abound
in miracles), as its direct scope is
to establish the particular
system
to which it is attributed; so has
it the same force, though
more indirectly,
to overthrow every other
system. In destroying a
rival system,
it likewise destroys the
credit of those miracles, on
which
that system was established; so
that all the prodigies of
different
religions are to be regarded as
contrary facts, and the
evidences
of these prodigies, whether weak
or strong, as opposite to
each other.
According to this method of
reasoning, when we believe
any miracle
of Mahomet or his successors,
we have for our warrant the
testimony
of a few barbarous Arabians: And
on the other hand, we are to
regard
the authority of Titus Livius,
Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in
short,
of all the authors and witnesses,
Grecian, Chinese, and Roman
Catholic,
who have related any miracle
in their particular
religion; I
say, we are to regard their
testimony in the same light
as if
they had mentioned that Mahometan
miracle, and had in express
terms
contradicted it, with the same
certainty as they have for
the miracle
they relate. This argument
may appear over subtile and
refined;
but is not in reality different
from the reasoning of a
judge, who
supposes that the credit of two
witnesses, maintaining a
crime against
any one, is destroyed by the
testimony of two others, who
affirm
him to have been two hundred
leagues distant, at the same
instant
when the crime is said to have
been committed.
96. One of the
best attested
miracles in all profane history, is
that which Tacitus reports
of Vespasian,
who cured a blind man in
Alexandria, by means of his
spittle,
and a lame man by the mere
touch of his foot; in
obedience
to a vision of the god Serapis, who
had enjoined them to have
recourse
to the Emperor, for these
miraculous cures. The story
may
be seen in that fine historian;* where
every circumstance seems to
add
weight to the testimony, and might
be displayed at large with
all the
force of argument and eloquence, if
any one were now concerned
to enforce
the evidence of that exploded
and idolatrous superstition.
The
gravity, solidity, age, and probity
of so great an emperor, who,
through
the whole course of his life,
conversed in a familiar
manner with
his friends and courtiers, and
never affected those
extraordinary
airs of divinity assumed by
Alexander and Demetrius. The
historian,
a contemporary writer, noted
for candour and veracity,
and withal,
the greatest and most
penetrating genius, perhaps,
of
all antiquity; and so free from any
tendency to credulity, that
he even
lies under the contrary
imputation, of atheism and
profaneness:
The persons, from whose
authority he related the
miracle,
of established character for
judgement and veracity, as
we may
well presume; eye-witnesses of the
fact, and confirming their
testimony,
after the Flavian family was
despoiled of the empire, and
could
no longer give any reward, as the
price of a lie. Utrumque,
qui interfuere,
nunc quoque memorant,
postquam nullum mendacio
pretium.
To which if we add the public nature
of the facts, as related, it
will
appear, that no evidence can well be
supposed stronger for so
gross and
so palpable a falsehood.
* Histories, iv.
81. Suetonius
gives nearly the same account,
Lives of the Caesars
(Vespasian).
There is also a
memorable
story related by Cardinal de Retz, which
may well deserve our
consideration.
When that intriguing politician
fled into Spain, to avoid
the persecution
of his enemies, he passed
through Saragossa, the
capital of
Aragon, where he was shewn, in the
cathedral, a man, who had
served
seven years as a doorkeeper, and
was well known to every body
in
town, that had ever paid his devotions
at that church. He had been
seen,
for so long a time, wanting a leg;
but recovered that limb by
the rubbing
of holy oil upon the stump; and
the cardinal assures us that
he
saw him with two legs. This miracle
was vouched by all the
canons of
the church; and the whole company
in town were appealed to for
a confirmation
of the fact; whom the
cardinal found, by their
zealous
devotion, to be thorough believers of
the miracle. Here the
relater was
also contemporary to the supposed
prodigy, of an incredulous
and libertine
character, as well as of
great genius; the miracle of
so
singular a nature as could scarcely
admit of a counterfeit, and
the
witnesses very numerous, and all of
them, in a manner,
spectators of
the fact, to which they gave their
testimony. And what adds
mightily
to the force of the evidence, and
may double our surprise on
this
occasion, is, that the cardinal
himself, who relates the
story,
seems not to give any credit to it,
and consequently cannot be
suspected
of any concurrence in the holy
fraud. He considered justly,
that
it was not requisite, in order to
reject a fact of this
nature, to
be able accurately to disprove the
testimony, and to trace its
falsehood,
through all the circumstances
of knavery and credulity
which produced
it. He knew, that, as this was
commonly altogether
impossible at
any small distance of time and
place; so was it extremely
difficult,
even where one was immediately
present, by reason of the
bigotry,
ignorance, cunning, and roguery
of a great part of mankind.
He therefore
concluded, like a just
reasoner, that such an
evidence
carried falsehood upon the very face
of it, and that a miracle,
supported
by any human testimony, was
more properly a subject of
derision
than of argument.
There surely never
was a greater
number of miracles ascribed to
one person, than those,
which were
lately said to have been wrought in
France upon the tomb of Abbe
Paris,
the famous Jansenist, with whose
sanctity the people were so
long
deluded. The curing of the sick,
giving hearing to the deaf,
and
sight to the blind, were every where
talked of as the usual
effects of
that holy sepulchre. But what is
more extraordinary; many of
the
miracles were immediately proved
upon the spot, before judges
of
unquestioned integrity, attested by
witnesses of credit and
distinction,
in a learned age, and on the most
eminent theatre that is now
in the
world. Nor is this all: a
relation of them was
published and
dispersed every where; nor were the
Jesuits, though a learned
body,
supported by the civil magistrate, and
determined enemies to those
opinions,
in whose favour the miracles
were said to have been
wrought,
ever able distinctly to refute or
detect them. Where shall we
find
such a number of circumstances,
agreeing to the
corroboration of
one fact? And what have we to
oppose to such a cloud of
witnesses,
but the absolute impossibility or
miraculous nature of the
events,
which they relate? And this surely,
in the eyes of all
reasonable people,
will alone be regarded as a
sufficient refutation.
97. Is the
consequence just,
because some human testimony has the
utmost force and authority
in some
cases, when it relates the battle
of Philippi or Pharsalia for
instance;
that therefore all kinds of
testimony must, in all
cases, have
equal force and authority?
Suppose that the Caesarean
and Pompeian
factions had, each of them,
claimed the victory in these
battles,
and that the historians of
each party had uniformly
ascribed
the advantage to their own side; how
could mankind, at this
distance,
have been able to determine between
them? The contrariety is
equally
strong between the miracles related
by Herodotus or Plutarch,
and those
delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any
monkish historian.
The wise lend a
very academic
faith to every report which favours
the passion of the reporter;
whether
it magnifies his country, his
family, or himself, or in
any other
way strikes in with his natural
inclinations and
propensities. But
what greater temptation than to
appear a missionary, a
prophet,
an ambassador from heaven? Who would
not encounter many dangers
and difficulties,
in order to attain so
sublime a character? Or if,
by the
help of vanity and a heated
imagination, a man has first
made
a convert of himself, and entered
seriously into the delusion
I who
ever scruples to make use of pious
frauds, in support of so
holy and
meritorious a cause?
The smallest spark
may here
kindle into the greatest flame;
because the materials are
always
prepared for it. The avidum genus
auricularum,* the gazing
populace,
receive greedily, without
examination, whatever sooths
superstition,
and promotes wonder.
* Lucretius.
How many stories
of this nature
have in all ages, been detected
and exploded in their
infancy? How
many more have been celebrated
for a time, and have
afterwards
sunk into neglect and oblivion?
Where such reports,
therefore, fly
about, the solution of the
phenomenon is obvious; and
we in
conformity to regular experience
and observation, when we
account
for it by the known and natural
principles of credulity and
delusion.
And shall we, rather than have a
recourse to so natural a
solution,
allow of a miraculous violation
of the most established laws
of
nature?
I need not mention
the difficulty
of detecting a falsehood in any
private or even public
history,
at the place, where it is said to
happen; much more when the
scene
is removed to ever so small a
distance. Even a court of
judicature,
with all the authority,
accuracy, and judgement,
which they
can employ, find themselves
often at a loss to
distinguish between
truth and falsehood in the most
recent actions. But the
matter never
comes to any issue, if trusted to
the common method of
altercations
and debate and flying rumours;
especially when men's
passions have
taken part on either side.
In the infancy of
new religions,
the wise and learned commonly
esteem the matter too
inconsiderable
to deserve their attention or
regard. And when afterwards
they
would willingly detect the cheat,
in order to undeceive the
deluded
multitude, the season is now past,
and the records and
witnesses, which
might clear up the matter, have
perished beyond recovery.
No means of
detection remain,
but those which must be drawn from the
very testimony itself of the
reporters:
and these, though always
sufficient with the
judicious and
knowing, are commonly too fine to
fall under the comprehension
of
the vulgar.
98. Upon the
whole, then,
it appears, that no testimony for any kind
of miracle has ever amounted
to
a probability, much less to a proof;
and that, even supposing it
amounted
to a proof, it would be opposed
by another proof, derived
from the
very nature of the fact, which it
would endeavour to
establish. It
is experience only, which gives
authority to human
testimony; and
it is the same experience, which
assures us of the laws of
nature.
When, therefore, these two kinds
of experience are contrary,
we have
nothing to do but substract the
one from the other, and
embrace
an opinion, either on one side or
the other, with that
assurance which
arises from the remainder. But
according to the principle
here
explained, this substraction, with
regard to all popular
religions,
amounts to an entire annihilation;
and therefore we may
establish it
as a maxim, that no human
testimony can have such
force as
to prove a miracle, and make it a
just foundation for any such
system
of religion.
99. I beg the
limitations
here made may be remarked, when I say,
that a miracle can never be
proved,
so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. For I
own, that
otherwise, there may possibly be
miracles, or violations of
the usual
course of nature, of such a
kind as to admit of proof
from human
testimony; though, perhaps, it
will be impossible to find
any such
in all the records of history.
Thus, suppose all authors,
in all
languages, agree, that, from the
first of January 1600, there
was
a total darkness over the whole earth
for eight days: suppose that
the
tradition of this extraordinary event
is still strong and lively
among
the people: that all travellers,
who return from foreign
countries,
bring us accounts of the same
tradition, without the least
variation
or contradiction: it is
evident, that our present
philosophers,
instead of doubting the
fact, ought to receive it as
certain,
and ought to search for the
causes whence it might be
derived.
The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature, is an
event
rendered probable by so many
analogies, that any
phenomenon,
which seems to have a tendency towards
that catastrophe, comes
within the
reach of human testimony, if that
testimony be very extensive
and
uniform.
But suppose, that
all the
historians who treat of England, should
agree, that, on the first of
January
1600, Queen Elizabeth died;
that both before and after
her death
she was seen by her physicians
and the whole court, as is
usual
with persons of her rank; that her
successor was acknowledged
and proclaimed
by the parliament; and that,
after being interred a
month, she
again appeared, resumed the
throne, and governed England
for
three years: I must confess that I
should be surprised at the
concurrence
of so many odd circumstances,
but should not have the
least inclination
to believe so miraculous
an event. I should not doubt
of
her pretended death, and of those
other public circumstances
that
followed it: I should only assert it
to have been pretended, and
that
it neither was, nor possibly could be
real. You would in vain
object to
me the difficulty, and almost
impossibility of deceiving
the world
in an affair of such consequence;
the wisdom and solid
judgement of
that renowned queen; with the little
or no advantage which she
could
reap from so poor an artifice: All
this might astonish me; but
I would
still reply, that the knavery
and folly of men are such
common
phenomena, that I should rather
believe the most
extraordinary events
to arise from their concurrence,
than admit of so signal a
violation
of the laws of nature.
But should this
miracle be
ascribed to any new system of religion;
men, in all ages, have been
so much
imposed on by ridiculous stories
of that kind, that this very
circumstance
would be a full proof of a
cheat, and sufficient, with
all
men of sense, not only to make them
reject the fact, but even
reject
it without farther examination.
Though the Being to whom the
miracle
is ascribed, be, in this case,
Almighty, it does not, upon
that
account, become a whit more probable;
since it is impossible for
us to
know the attributes or actions of
such a Being, otherwise than
from
the experience which we have of
his productions, in the
usual course
of nature. This still reduces
us to past observation, and
obliges
us to compare the instances of the
violation of truth in the
testimony
of men, with those of the
violation of the laws of
nature
by miracles, in order to judge which
of them is most likely and
probable.
As the violations of truth are
more common in the testimony
concerning
religious miracles, than in
that concerning any other
matter
of fact; this must diminish very much
the authority of the former
testimony,
and make us form a general
resolution, never to lend
any attention
to it, with whatever
specious pretence it may be
covered.
Lord Bacon seems
to have embraced
the same principles of
reasoning. "We ought," says
he,
"to make a collection or particular
history of all monsters and
prodigious
births or productions, and in a
word of everything new,
rare, and
extraordinary in nature. But this
must be done with the most
severe
scrutiny, lest we depart from truth.
Above all, every relation
must be
considered as suspicious, which
depends in any degree upon
religion,
as the prodigies of Livy: And
no less so, everything that
is to
be found in the writers of natural
magic or alchemy, or such
authors,
who seem, all of them, to have an
unconquerable appetite for
falsehood
and fable."*
* Novum Organum,
II, aph.
29.
100. I am the
better pleased
with the method of reasoning here
delivered, as I think it may
serve
to confound those dangerous friends
or disguised enemies to the
Christian
Religion, who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles
of human
reason. Our most holy religion is
founded on Faith, not on
reason;
and it is a sure method of exposing
it to put it to such a trial
as
it is, by no means, fitted to
endure. To make this more
evident,
let us examine those miracles,
related in scripture; and
not to
lose ourselves in too wide a field,
let us confine ourselves to
such
as we find in the Pentateuch, which
we shall examine, according
to the
principles of these pretended
Christians, not as the word
or testimony
of God himself, but as the
production of a mere human
writer
and historian. Here then we are
first to consider a book,
presented
to us by a barbarous and
ignorant people, written in
an age
when they were still more
barbarous, and in all
probability
long after the facts which it
relates, corroborated by no
concurring
testimony, and resembling those
fabulous accounts, which
every nation
gives of its origin. Upon
reading this book, we find
it full
of prodigies and miracles. It gives
an account of a state of the
world
and of human nature entirely
different from the present:
Of our
fall from that state: Of the age of
man, extended to near a
thousand
years: Of the destruction of the
world by a deluge: Of the
arbitrary
choice of one people, as the
favourites of heaven; and
that people
the countrymen of the author: Of
their deliverance from
bondage by
prodigies the most astonishing
imaginable: I desire anyone
to lay
his hand upon his heart, and
after a serious
consideration declare,
whether he thinks that the
falsehood of such a book,
supported
by such a testimony, would be more
extraordinary and miraculous
than
all the miracles it relates; which
is, however, necessary to
make it
be received, according to the
measures of probability
above established.
101. What we have
said of
miracles may be applied, without any
variation, to prophecies;
and indeed,
all prophecies are real
miracles, and as such only,
can
be admitted as proofs of any
revelation. If it did not
exceed
the capacity of human nature to
foretell future events, it
would
be absurd to employ any prophecy as
an argument for a divine
mission
or authority from heaven. So that,
upon the whole, we may
conclude,
that the Christian Religion not
only was at first attended
with
miracles, but even at this day
cannot be believed by any
reasonable
person without one. Mere reason
is insufficient to convince
us of
its veracity: And whoever is moved
by Faith to assent to it, is
conscious
of a continued miracle in his
own person, which subverts
all the
principles of his understanding,
and gives him a
determination to
believe what is most contrary to
custom and experience.
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